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
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
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
SOME CHAPTERS FROM THE HISTORY OF THE RHINE COUNTRY

BY
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
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PREFATORY NOTE

THE following chapters represent the beginning of an attempt to ascertain some of the causes which led up to the German emigration to Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century. They were written under the direction of Professor William M. Sloane of Columbia University.



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CHAPTER I

FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS FROM 1600 TO 1650

IN order to understand the relations between France and the German states during the reign of Louis XIV, it is necessary to take a preliminary survey of French-German affairs during the half-century immediately preceding that period. The long religious wars of the sixteenth century in France had so weakened the government that little attention came to be paid to foreign affairs, but with the accession of Henry IV to the throne of France we come to a period of strong foreign policy. It is the time of the conception of the Grand Design as elaborated in the Memoirs of Henry's great finance minister, the Duc de Sully.¹

Two days after the battle of Ivry, according to this authority, Henry had spoken indefinitely of a certain great ambition which possessed him, but he had complained that such mere wishes often failed to develop into plans. This indefinite reference is followed in the Memoirs of succeeding years by many allusions to the Great Design of the King, which is finally fully elaborated by Sully. According to him, Henry was planning to unite the Christian nations of Europe into a confederated republic,² made up of fifteen different states, all

¹ *Oeconomies Royales*, by Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de Sully. (Ed. Michaud et Poujoulat.)

² "S'il ne seroit pas à desirer que de tous les estats et peuples de la chrestienté d'Europe, l'on pust former une seule république—

"S'il ne seroit pas à desirer de pouvoir rendre à peu près toutes ces quinze dominations esgales en estenduë de pays, Estats, force, puissance et autorité afin qu'ils n'eussent rien à craindre les uns des autres." Sully, *Memoirs*, i, 429.

of which should have approximately equal power. The policy of this immense confederation was to be one of peace within and a combined attack upon the Turks without. In what he calls a reply¹ to a letter from Henry of August 4, 1605, Sully reports that the plan had been submitted to the Kings of Denmark, Sweden and England, to Venice, to the Prince of Orange and the States of Holland, to the Protestant princes of Germany, to the Duke of Savoy and the Pope—and that it had been approved by them all. He also gives the text of a letter supposed to have been written by him to King Henry in 1607, which makes suggestions for the successful execution of the great plan. According to this document the German princes must be conciliated and assurance given them that Henry would defend their interests with a strong army.

The Duc de Sully's account of the Grand Design has been vigorously attacked ever since it first appeared. One of the best examinations of the famous plan has been written by M. Ch. Pfister in the *Revue Historique*.²

There the charge is made that Sully is guilty of fabricating at least the details of the scheme and of ascribing his own policies to the King. Pfister claims that Henry had no idea of going to war in quest of the chimera of universal peace and harmony among the three religions. He shows that no description of the Design appeared in Henry's life-time, or in the years immediately following his death, but that the

¹ "Vos grands desseins pour establir une république très-chrestienne par l'union de tous les potentats Chrestiens de l'Europe, et un ordre pour reduire tous les plus grands d'iceux à une presque esgale estendue de domination"—

"Que tous les susnommez avoient approuvé ses desseins." Sully, ii, 66. See also ii, 150, 215, 330, 435.

² Vols. 54, 55, 56. For a list of other works on the Grand Design see, *Séances de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, lviii, 368. Also, *Historische Zeitschrift*, xxxiii, 194.

mass of inventions dates from the year 1620 or later when Sully was out of power and wished to regain his influence.¹

Although there is a general tendency to reject the details of the Grand Design as given by Sully, we can well accept its fundamental idea so far as Germany is concerned—that of a reorganization of the Empire by the aid of a league of German princes. Henry's antagonism to Spain had not been affected by his change of religion; he was also not insensible to the advantage of an extension of French territory. It was natural that he should strive for the weakening of the power of the Hapsburg house in Germany—natural that he should look to the Protestant states of Germany as his allies, for they also regarded the Hapsburg power with great distrust.

The German princes who were inclined to support France against the Emperor were Maurice the Wise, Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Würtemberg and the Elector of Brandenburg. But they hesitated to ally themselves directly with France, not wishing to appear as traitors to the Emperor. The French agent in Germany, the Calvinist Bongars, had before him the difficult task of winning the German princes to Henry's hoped-for offensive movement against the House of Hapsburg. He had not only to reassure them on account of Henry's conversion to Catholicism and his Italian marriage, but he had to convince them of the King's zeal for German liberty.

Granting that Henry had not elaborated the Grand Design by any means so fully as Sully's Memoirs would make it appear, there is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence² to show

¹ Moriz Ritter, *Abhandlungen der bayerischen Akademie*.

² "Le Roi repartit qu'il aurait souhaité que les princes allemands formassent une confédération. A quoi je lui exposai qu'une mesure si salutaire n'était pas encore prise, mais que j'en avais l'esperance, pourvu que lui-même volût bien servir de base à l'alliance. Le Roi

that the King was for years engaged in negotiations with certain German princes for the purpose of forming a confederation, which, with the aid of France, should be a check to the Hapsburgs and Spain. As early as 1602, he had urged Maurice of Hesse to form such a confederation, and had been assured that it would be done, if they could be certain of French support. Henry replied ¹ that he would be ready to join the union as soon as the German princes had found some basis for a permanent and harmonious alliance among themselves. At the same time the Landgrave had recommended that Henry send a mission to the German electors in order to oppose the choice of a Hapsburg candidate as King of the Romans,² the successor to the Emperor.

Negotiations for a union continued among the German States after this time, and Henry repeatedly urged ³ that some sort of an alliance be concluded at once, but the German princes were slow to come to an agreement. On October 6, 1606, the French king wrote to Maurice of Hesse, calling upon all the princes to unite ⁴ who were interested in pre-

répliqua qu'il y était bien disposé pourvu que les Princes eux mêmes fussent d'accord."

(Conversation between Henry IV and Maurice of Hesse on Sept. 30, 1602 O. S., as reported by the latter. See de Rommel, *Correspondance Inédite de Henri IV*, p. 73.

¹ "Mon cousin, vous irez dire aux Princes d'Allemagne, qui vous sont affidés que je le veux bien, et que je vous aiderai et maintiendrai en tout, seulement que vous soyez bien unis et gouverniez vos affaires avec bon conseil." *Ibid.*, p. 77. See also Martin Philippon, *Historische Zeitschrift*, xxxiii, 224.

² *Corresp. de Henri IV*, de Rommel, p. 76.

³ "Je vous exorte et prie de toute mon affection, de continuer à mettre les deux mains à l'oeuvre."

Letter from Henry to Maurice of Hesse, March 28, 1607. De Rommel, p. 344.

⁴ "Plus besoin que jamais de l'union et bonne intelligence des princes qui ayment, comme vous non moins le repos général de la Chrestienté, que la manutention particulière de leur liberté et auctorité." De Rommel, p. 328.

serving their own liberty and authority as well as the general peace of Christendom. Finally, in 1608, the Evangelical Union was formed by the Elector Palatine, Prince Christian of Anhalt, Philip Louis of Neuburg and other princes, along with many imperial cities such as Strasburg, Nuremberg and Ulm. The avowed purpose of this union was to protect the evangelical religion, but the religious element in it was largely a mask to hide the real object. Christian of Anhalt, the moving spirit in the formation of the league, was in the pay of France, and we have seen what was the aim of the French king in the formation of such a confederation of German princes. It might prove to be a protection to religion indirectly, but his main purpose was to hold Spain in check in the Netherlands, and weaken Austria by a reorganization of Germany.

Two years after the formation of the Union, came Henry's opportunity to interfere directly in German affairs. The Convention of Hall in Suabia, signed by the German princes and French representative, Boissise, ratified the union of 1608, and bound Henry to support the Protestant claims in the Juliers-Cleves controversy; the Union was, in turn, to aid France against Spain in any war which might result from the French intervention in Juliers. But although Henry assembled a great army in accordance with this agreement, and was on the point of setting out for the German border when his assassination suddenly put an end to all his designs, it was uncertain even at that late date what his plans for the war really were.¹ Prince Christian had been in Paris in April,

¹ "La chose va si lentement que Monsieur le prince d'Anhalt m'a dict que quelque grande familiarité que lui tesmoignast le roy, qu'il ne pouvoit pénétrer aux intentions de Sa Majesté."

Letter written by Jacob Anjorant, Genevan delegate to Paris, to his home government, April 2, 1610. In *Séances et Travaux de L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, lviii, 389.

1610, and had been closely associated with the King: he had been regarded as Henry's choice as the leader of the German army, and yet it seems that he had been unable to learn what Henry really proposed to do. It is possible that Henry himself did not have any definite aims in preparing for hostilities, at least as to the ultimate results of the war. At the first glance one might conclude that he simply wished to get possession of the Princess Condé, who had fled to Brussels; but it is not probable that Henry would jeopardize the state, even in order to lead back to Paris the most beautiful woman of France. His military preparations were also on too great a scale for the settlement of the Juliers-Cleves dispute. It is probable that he had expected an Austrian intervention and an ensuing general war; by means of that conflict he seems to have hoped, with the aid of the German confederation, to give a decided check to the growth of the Hapsburg power.

From the death of Henry IV until Richelieu came into control of the government, France took no active part in German affairs. The Regency was a period of comparative weakness, for there was no one to take up the great project of Henry—the humiliation of the House of Austria. Richelieu soon understood the value to France, however, of the unsettled conditions in Germany resulting from the Thirty Years' War, and he proceeded to take advantage of them. His purpose in interfering in German affairs was purely political; as Henry had done before him, he supported the Protestant princes, not because he wished to protect their religion, not even in order to put an end to religious strife in Germany, but because those opponents of the Emperor could be employed in weakening the House of Hapsburg. The overthrow of Austrian domination he regarded as the preliminary to the rise of France as one of the greatest powers in Europe; with unfailing perseverance and a matchless diplomacy he devoted the greater part of his ministry to the

attainment of that end. It was his most important project, next to the consolidation of the government in France.

His plan did not at first include a direct attack upon the Emperor by French arms. He sought rather to keep alive that anti-Hapsburg feeling, which had partly caused, and was partly created by the great war then in progress. In Sweden there was an ambitious young king, a veteran of many battles, who viewed with anxiety the success of the Catholic armies in Germany. Therefore, in 1628 Richelieu offered Gustavus Adolphus an annual subsidy of 500,000 livres for two years if he would interfere in the German war in favor of the Protestant princes. In order that Sweden might be free to take such a step, a French agent, Charnacé, arranged a truce between the Northern kingdom and Poland, which were then at war. Encouraged by this French support, Gustavus finally landed in Pomerania in June, 1630.

Catholic influence in Germany was then at its height. The Danish intervention had been an utter failure; the Emperor had rooted out the reformed religion in his hereditary dominions and had just promulgated the Edict of Restitution; a great army was at his service, under the command of a successful general, Albert von Waldstein. But Richelieu, though a good Catholic, was a better Frenchman and did not wish to see a united Germany under the control of the Catholic Hapsburgs. In addition to supporting the Swedish invasion, he adopted the plan of encouraging the Protestant party in Germany.

To bring this about, he made use of one of the most romantic characters in all the history of diplomacy—the Capuchin monk, François Leclerc du Tremblay, better known as Father Joseph. The German Diet was soon to assemble at Ratisbon;¹ Richelieu accordingly sent Father Joseph and

¹ For an accurate account of the work of Father Joseph at the Diet of Ratisbon see G. Fagniez, in *Revue Historique*, xxvii, 285.

M. Brulart de Léon on a mission to the German princes who were to meet there. As a result of some very clever intriguing, the French representatives succeeded in making their influence strongly felt in German affairs. The German princes were encouraged in their opposition to Waldstein; largely as a result of the French support they also refused to choose the Emperor's son as his successor. The French envoys also negotiated a treaty with Ferdinand, which granted all the claims of the French allies in Italy, but bound France not to aid the enemies of the Emperor. This treaty might have led to the establishment of peace in Germany, had it not been at once repudiated by Richelieu, who ordered Father Joseph into his convent for exceeding instructions. This charge has not been substantiated, and as a result of the incident, Richelieu has often been accused of insincerity in his peace negotiations.

Whatever may have been the causes of the repudiation of the treaty of Ratisbon, French influence was at any rate thrown completely upon the side of Sweden and a continuation of the war, when in January, 1631, Gustavus Adolphus made public the alliance with France. Sweden was to receive 1,200,000 livres a year for five years, and agreed in return, to carry on the war in Germany with an army of 36,000 men. At about the same time, Father Joseph, already restored to favor, appeared before the King and Council with a memorial¹ which outlined a policy "to take advantage of the present state of affairs in Germany." He pointed out that

¹ "Pour profiter de l'état présent des affaires d'Allemagne, par suite de ce qui vient de se passer a la diète de Ratisbonne par l'entremise du roi, il faut continuer le soin que l'on a pris de porter les catholiques et les protestans, à mettre dans la personne de sa majesté leur affection et leur appui, et les détacher par conséquent de la dépendance servile dans laquelle la maison d'Autriche les tient depuis si long-temps." Fllassan, *Histoire de la Diplomatie Française*, ii, 444.

the experience at the Diet at Ratisbon had shown that the German princes could be united by the King of France against the Emperor; that policy should be continued, the King should take his place as mediator in the affairs of Germany, and thus gain an authority equal to that of the Emperor; this intervention should be accompanied by definite promises of military support against the House of Hapsburg. Richelieu recognized the value of this plan and followed it out so successfully that in May of the same year a secret treaty was signed between France and Bavaria, by which France recognized the electoral dignity of the Duke, and the two governments mutually promised aid in case of attack.¹

By the victory of Breitenfeld, Gustavus Adolphus re-established the equilibrium in Germany. This was exactly what Richelieu had desired, for it gave France the predominant influence and the opportunity to reap decided advantages from the war without actually taking part in it. The Cardinal was also more or less clearly following the policy which later became the gospel of the Revolutionary leaders—the extension of the French boundaries to the Rhine.² However, as a moderate Swedish success opened the way for French expansion, so the continued victories of Gustavus Adolphus diminished that opportunity. Richelieu viewed the Snow King's triumphant march through Germany with distrust and jealousy, for he no more wished a powerful Protestant empire as a neighbor than he had been in favor of the domination of the Catholic Hapsburg power. Therefore, he took under French protection the Cardinal of Treves and others who were frightened at the Swedish advance. He induced Gustavus to turn eastward from Mayence and not continue his march across the Rhine into Lorraine. It might

¹ Flassan, ii, 455.

² Bougeant, *Hist. du Traité de Westphalie*, iv, 174.

finally have come to an open rupture between France and Sweden had Gustavus not fallen at Lützen before the Emperor's power had been completely broken. It is not probable that Richelieu learned of the death of his ally with very deep regret.¹ He determined not to lose the advantages which France might gain as a result of the Swedish invasion. The Marquis de Feuquières, a relative of Father Joseph, was sent to the Conference of Protestant Princes at Heilbronn in 1633.² Supported by French influence, the Swedish Chancellor Oxenstiern became the head of the Protestant league, but his powers were limited by the Conference. France granted Sweden a million livres annually to continue the war. The way was thus opened for an immense increase of French influence upon the Rhine, because the combined opposition of Swedes and German princes prevented the Emperor from defending his territory in that quarter; Richelieu was free to subdue and annex Lorraine.

Meanwhile Waldstein had been in no hurry to reconquer the territory gained by the Swedes, or even to oppose the advance of the allies into Bavaria. He had even opened negotiations with France and Sweden, with the probable intention of deserting the Emperor's cause entirely. These intrigues were cut short by his assassination in February, 1634, and the allies were forced thereafter to fight to gain their ends. The complete defeat of the Swedes at Nördlingen within a few months restored to the Emperor much that Gustavus had won, and opened the way for the treaty of Prague. By this agreement the Elector of Saxony deserted the Protestants and joined his forces to those of the Emperor.

¹ "On pouvait dire que S.M. n'y avait peut-être beaucoup perdu à la mort du roi de Suède." 4 Dec., 1632—minute prepared at a meeting of King and Council; it is said to give Richelieu's opinion. *Lettres de Richelieu*, vii, 686.

² Danjou, II Series, iv, 285.

George William of Brandenburg and other Protestant princes consented to the provisions of the treaty, and a general peace might have been arranged but for the opposition of France and Sweden. The favorable terms granted to Spain and Austria would have wrecked Richelieu's plans for the extension of French power; he could, however, no longer attain his ends by diplomacy, and he therefore decided upon active intervention in the war. The capture of the Elector of Treves by the Spaniards in 1635 lent a pretext for the beginning of hostilities.

Although Richelieu probably chose the wisest course for France in thus continuing the war, he was not able to bring it to a favorable close. The conflict dragged on for years, with few advantages on either side. In 1638-9, Bernhard of Weimar won some victories for the allies, but his very success was a source of anxiety to France, for he dreamed of carving out a strong state for himself in Alsace.¹ As in the case of Gustavus Adolphus, however, this menace to Richelieu's plans was removed by the premature death of Bernhard. Finally, in 1642, Richelieu himself passed off the stage, before the close of the war, it is true, but not until the ultimate success of his German policy was practically assured.

The mantle of Richelieu fell upon his ablest assistant, Jules Mazarin, who had already demonstrated his ability in diplomatic affairs. He was to follow his chief's policy in bringing the war to a close and arranging the peace conditions.² Negotiations for a conference of the different powers at war had begun as early as 1636. The death of the bigoted Ferdinand II in the following year removed one of the obstacles to a conclusion of the war. In 1639 Mazarin had

¹ Ranke, *Französ. Gesch.*, ii, 367.

² An account of the negotiations which led up to the peace conference can be found in any good history of the Thirty Years' War.

been appointed as the French representative at the peace conference, but he selected other envoys when he came in control of the French government. The belligerent powers were in no hurry to open the conference, however, because each was waiting for some decisive military success. It was not until 1644 that the delegates came together in the neighboring cities of Osnabrück and Münster; but little was done even then, for the military situation was still undecided. The French proposals were finally submitted in 1645; they provided that France should retain the greater part of the conquests which she had made on the Rhine. Spain was opposed to this cession of territory, and used her influence to detach Holland from the French alliance. The Dutch were alarmed at the French successes of 1646, and in the following year consented to treat separately from France. The Duke of Bavaria had joined France and Sweden shortly before, in order to save his dominions from violence. Encouraged by the defection of Holland, he returned to his allegiance to the Emperor. The French and Swedes then overran Bavaria and ravaged the country; they entered Bohemia and laid siege to Prague. Thoroughly alarmed, both the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria were at last ready to treat seriously for peace. France was also weary of the long struggle; Mazarin already saw signs of internal disturbance, and earnestly desired the conclusion of the German war, although the charge was made that his peace negotiations were insincere.¹

The military reverses of the Emperor allowed the expression at the peace conference of that anti-Hapsburg feeling which had been fermenting in Germany for many years.

¹ "Tout le monde peut croire et dire que je veuille ou ne veuille pas la paix; (cela) m'importe peu, puisque Sa Majesté sçait avec quelle ardeur je la souhaite et est satisfaite des soins que j'ay pris jusqu' icy pour l'avancer." *Lettres de Mazarin*, ii, 440.

This opposition is, perhaps, best illustrated in the teachings of the book *Hyppolytus a Lapide* which had appeared anonymously in 1640. It had become very popular, and had widely influenced public opinion during the closing years of the war.¹ It may be said to lay down the principles upon which that part of the treaty of Westphalia was formed, which determined the relations between the Emperor and the German princes.

The writer of this famous book, the jurist Chemnitz, taught that the power of the Emperor was a danger to German institutions; that it should be transferred to an imperial assembly and to the individual princes.² He urged all men to take up arms against the tyrannical House which had sought to take away the ancient German liberties; the Hapsburgs should be expelled from Germany entirely, and their lands confiscated; Chemnitz claimed that France and Sweden would join in an attack upon the Emperor, and yet such a headless, disunited empire as Chemnitz wished to establish was exactly the system which foreign powers most desired in Germany. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the peace conference the policy of weakening the Emperor was supported in the name of the German States by both France and Sweden. The treaty³ as finally adopted declared that the making or interpretation of laws, the declaration of war, the levying of taxes, the construction of fortresses, the conclusion of peace and alliances should be controlled by the Diet instead of by the Emperor. The individual princes received power to make treaties among themselves or with foreign

¹ Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 391.

² "Nach seiner Vorstellung sollte in Teutschland....die wahre Majestät des Reichs vielmehr auf der gesammten Reichsversammlung, als auf der Person des Kaisers haften." Pütter, *Staatsverfassung*, ii, 43.

³ Bougeant, *Histoire du Traité de Westphalie*, iii, 527.

powers, provided that such arrangements were not contrary to the interests of the Empire.

Further evidence of the distrust of the Emperor, of the lack of patriotism and the dependence upon foreign powers of the German princes is to be found in the cession of Imperial and Austrian territory under the treaty of Westphalia. Extensive districts were transferred to Sweden in North Germany; very little opposition was made by the German princes to the French claims in the South. The bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun were given up, as well as Breisach and the greater part of Alsace. Although the care on the part of France and Sweden for their own interests,¹ and their desertion in the peace conference of the cause of the Elector Palatine, showed conclusively that they had not intervened in Germany for the preservation of German liberty or from friendship for the Protestant princes, the latter were nevertheless still forced to look to foreign support, for they distrusted the Catholic Emperor. Since they feared France and Sweden less than the Hapsburgs, they consented that the two allies be made the guarantors of the treaty. That the King of France might be in a position to enforce its provisions he received the right to maintain a garrison in the great German fortress of Philipsburg on the Rhine,² with free entrance into the Empire whenever he should think it necessary. Thus, for fear of the Emperor, the German princes delivered up one of the gateways of the Empire to the greatest enemy of Germany.

From the French standpoint, the treaty of Westphalia was

¹ Servien told the Swedish envoys that they should "se relacher sur les articles de l'intérêt public d'Allemagne à proportion qu'on les satisfait sur leurs intérêts particuliers." Flassan, iii, 159.

² "la passage devra aussi être libre au Roi par terre et par eau dans l'Empire, toutes les fois qu'il sera besoin d'y conduire des soldats, des munitions, et autres choses nécessaires. Bougeant, iii, 532.

a fitting conclusion to the plans and efforts of half a century. Not only did France gain control of coveted districts on the Rhine with approaches to the Empire, but that Empire was rendered headless and nerveless, incapable of decisive or consistent action. As if this were not enough, France also received the right to interfere in German affairs. The way was open for the great expansion of French influence under Louis XIV.

CHAPTER II

THE FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF THE RHINE, 1650-1658

IT was not easy for a generation which had known nothing but war to believe that peace had really come with the treaties¹ of Westphalia. This uncertainty as to the future in Germany was increased by the fact that Spain and France continued hostilities long after 1648; this conflict in the Spanish territories on the northeast of France constantly threatened to involve the Empire. The danger was especially great because the Emperor Ferdinand III, being closely related to the Hapsburgs in Spain, was unwilling to carry out those provisions of the treaty of Münster which increased the power of France at the expense of the Empire and Spain. He delayed the cession of territory to the Duke of Savoy,² the ally of France in Italy, but worse than this, he directly aided the Spanish in the Netherlands by sending them troops and supplies. From these causes, conditions on the Rhine during the years immediately following the treaties of West-

¹ It will be remembered that the peace of Westphalia was brought about by the conclusion of a number of treaties among the different powers which were negotiating at Osnabrück and Münster.

² "Malgré ses engagements solennels, ce prince viola le traité de Westphalie en secourant les Espagnols contre la France.... en refusant au duc de Savoie l'investiture de la partie du Montferrat qui lui était devolue." M. Mignet, *Négociations Relatives à la Succession d'Espagne*, ii, 13.

In volume 62 of the *Collection de Documents Inédits sur l'Histoire de France*.

phalia were about as bad as they could be. Knowing the attitude of the emperor toward neutrality, the French naturally relinquished their hold upon German territory very slowly. The Spanish and Lorraine troops had even less respect for German neutrality, and invaded the Rhine countries at will. Bands of these wild soldiers roamed about plundering and burning, as if no peace had been declared. The Spaniards kept possession of the Palatinate city of Frankenthal near Worms, and all the efforts of the recently-restored Elector Charles Louis, aided by the Estates of the Circle¹ of the Upper Rhine, were not sufficient to dislodge them.

The natural result of these deplorable conditions was that men began to think of a union among those little principalities which were too weak to protect themselves. The decade following the conclusion of the treaties of Westphalia was therefore full of plans for union. Sometimes the result was to be gained by the aid of one of the great powers, sometimes it was to be accomplished independently of all of them. As early as 1647,² in the course of the peace negotiations which closed the Thirty Years' War, the Elector of Brandenburg had attempted to form a union of the Protestant states. In 1649; the Landgravine Amelia Elizabeth, of Hesse-Cassel, began negotiations with the Elector Maximilian, of Bavaria, for a league of German princes, which should be independent of both France and Sweden. It was to include both Catholics and Protestants, Bavaria and Hesse-Cassel being the respective leaders of the two religious parties. These plans were upset by the death of both the Landgravine and the Elector, and were not taken up by their successors.

¹ From the time of Maximilian I, the Empire had been divided into ten administrative Circles or Kreise. The system of Circle Government detracted little from the almost independent powers of the various German princes.

² Friedr. Rich. Brandstetter. *Kurbrandenburgische Unionsbestrebungen*, 1647-8.

The hopes of the German princes were centered, however, in a conference which met in Nuremberg in April, 1649. A great many questions arising from the long war remained to be settled by this Congress, which was also to provide for the execution of the treaties of 1648. Accordingly all complaints of violation of these agreements came before the body in Nuremberg. The French representatives, MM. Vautorte and Avaugour, protested because of the Spanish occupation of Frankenthal, and demanded possession of an equally advantageous position on the Rhine frontier as long as the Spanish should remain where they were. The post which the French demanded was Ehrenbreitstein, but the Emperor offered to allow them Heilbronn instead, which they already held. On the other hand, the Elector Charles Louis, of the Palatinate, demanded Frankenthal for himself, as being a part of his own territory. Since the Emperor was unwilling to aid in forcing the Spaniards out of Frankenthal, it was finally agreed that Charles Louis should receive an indemnity and possession of Heilbronn as long as the Spaniards held Frankenthal. France was by this time so discredited by the growing internal troubles known collectively as "the Fronde," that the French claims could not be pressed with any success.

Meanwhile the ravages continued in the territories along the Rhine. Aroused by the Emperor's sympathy for Spain as shown in the Congress of Nuremberg and in the marriage of his daughter to Philip IV¹ of Spain, some of the more active princes, led by Bavaria and Mayence, planned to form a union,² raise a large army, drive the foreign bands out of the Empire, and establish peace and order. They could not agree upon details, however, and as a result nothing at all was done, although the Spanish force in Frankenthal num-

¹ A. Chéruef, *Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Mazarin*, iii, 79.

² Erdmannsdörffer, *Gesch.*, i, 18.

bered only one thousand men. The Congress of Nuremberg wished to do something to aid the hard pressed states of the West, and accordingly passed a resolution authorizing the Elector of Mayence, High Chancellor of the Empire, to bring about a conference of the Circle of the Rhine for the purpose of considering means of defense.¹

The endangered states² did not wait long to act upon this suggestion. Less than a month after the resolution had passed the Congress, delegates from the different Estates in the Circle of the Upper Rhine assembled in Worms; after a short conference a plan of action was adopted on September 3, 1650. One last attempt was to be made to enforce the treaties by peaceable means. In case this should fail, a joint conference was to be held with representatives of the Electoral Circle of the Rhine to arrange for the common defense. The lower Circle had been almost equally prompt in calling a meeting of delegates pursuant to the Nuremberg resolution of July 30, but they did not come together until November. The outlook was then very gloomy. The Emperor had just sent four thousand troops into the Netherlands in spite of French protests.³ Detachments of Lorrainers were breaking into the Rhine states to take up winter quarters. It was feared that Marshal Turenne might also invade the Empire because of the Emperor's intervention in the war to aid Spain. Thus, surrounded by dangers, the assembly of delegates from

¹ "Das die Angehörigen der beiden Kreise Kur- und Ober-Rhein, wie auch andere wegen der Vicinität und sonst daher beschwerte Kurfürsten und Stände nach Anleitung der Reichskonstitutionen und Exekutionsordnung sich zusammenthun möchten." Quoted by Joachim, *Rheinbund*, p. 3.

² For the development of this Kur-rheinische Kreisrecess, see Joachim, *Die Entwicklung des Rheinbundes*, the German authority on conditions on the Rhine for the decade following the peace of Westphalia.

³ Henri Vast, *Les Grands Traités du Règne de Louis XIV.* In Collection de Textes, vol. xiv, 65.

the Electoral Circle gladly received the envoys from the Upper Rhine, who appeared in Frankfort on December 12. On December 30 an invitation was sent to the Circles of Franconia, Suabia, and Westphalia to take part in the conference. At the same time a notice was sent to the Emperor, assuring him of the inoffensive character of the alliance which had been planned.

It was an exceedingly difficult matter to form any sort of a union, because of the many conflicting interests represented at Frankfort. The negotiations dragged on interminably in true German style. At the beginning of March, 1651, the Elector Palatine returned to Heidelberg and refused to take any further part in the movement, because the proposed league would not insist upon the immediate evacuation of Frankenthal, and, secondly, because the Emperor had not yet given his consent to a union among the princes on the Rhine. His withdrawal did not discourage the other states, however; dissatisfied with the slowness of the proceedings, the three ecclesiastical Electors—those of Cologne, Mayence and Treves—finally took matters into their own hands, and signed a compact on March 21, 1651. This decisive action proved to be of great importance, for the compact was the germ of the Rheinbund which reached its full development seven years later. By this agreement of March 21 provision was made for the admission of the Circle of the Upper Rhine and other districts. Each member of the league was to furnish a specified contingent of troops for the common defense. These troops could be called out to defend any member of the league who was in danger, and were to be under the command of the prince whom they were to aid. These provisions proved satisfactory to the Circle of the Upper Rhine and a compact embodying them was signed by most of the states in the two Rhine Circles on April 12.

Organized as it was for the purpose of protecting its mem-

bers from outside attacks, this league on the Rhine was no menace to the Emperor or to the peace of the Empire. On the other hand, the comparatively weak forces at its command could not insure protection against aggressions from without. It was simply a step in the right direction; although it was not strong enough to coerce France or the Emperor, it at least attracted widespread attention, and was a cause of apprehension to the Duke of Lorraine¹ whose subjects had been making lawless raids in the territory of the Empire.

One of the causes which contributed to the disorders in Germany at this time was the great decline in French influence owing to those internal troubles in France known as the Fronde. We have seen that Mazarin had hastened the negotiations at Münster because he already saw signs of the approaching storm. Although the treaty of peace as finally signed was a great diplomatic victory for France and opened up almost unlimited possibilities for the extension of French influence in Germany, it was either left unnoticed in France or openly condemned by the majority of people. Simultaneously with the conclusion of the negotiations at Münster the Regent was forced to sign the humiliating Declaration of St. Germain which recognized many of the claims of the Frondists; this attack upon the royal prerogative inaugurated a civil war which endangered all the advantages gained through the successful foreign policy.²

¹ "Le bruit court icy, que Leurs AA. EE. respectivement de Mayence, Coulogne, Vre. Alt. et le Seigneur Ducq de Nieubourg auroient à faire une ligue ensemble pour s'opposer contre toutes les forces estrangers pour tout cas qu'il y pourroit arrivaît respectivement au territoire des dits Seigneurs et Princes. Le Seigneur Ducq de Lorraine y tesmoigne ung desplaisir extrême." Report made to his government from Brussels on March 9, 1651, by the Brandenburg representative Staveren. Quoted by Joachim, p. II, from *Urk. u. Akten zur Gesch. des Grossen Kurfürsten*, vi, 21.

² A good general account of the Fronde, its origin, development and effects, will be found in the opening chapter of the sixth volume of the *Histoire Générale*, edited by M^M. Lavisé and Rambaud.

The effect of these internal disorders soon became apparent in the negotiations which France was carrying on in Germany incident to the execution of the peace treaty. As we have seen, the French representatives at the Congress of Nuremberg protested in vain against the assistance which Spain was receiving from the Empire, and they were unable to obtain any compensating advantages, although the same men had taken part in the negotiations at Münster where the French influence had been predominant. Conditions had changed, however, and it was doubtful whether France could even maintain the sovereignty over the ten cities of Alsace¹ which had been granted by the treaty of peace. Because of the weakness of the French government at home, M. Vautorte, one of the French envoys to Ratisbon, advised that the whole question be left in abeyance until France should be once again strong enough to assert the claim vigorously. Shortly after this he advised his government of the extreme danger in which the newly-acquired posts of Breisach and Philipsburg stood; ² he claimed that Philipsburg, the strategic position upon the Rhine, would be lost to France within a very short time unless the garrison was strengthened and better equipped. Just as were his criticisms, however, his warning was not heeded by France,³ simply because no attention

¹ "Le droit de protection sur les dix Villes a besoin d'être manié fort délicatement, si on désire en tirer quelque jour de l'avantage. Il semble à propos de le laisser maintenant reposer pour aprivoiser les esprits et guérir les soupçons; outre que l'état present de nos affaires ne nous permet pas d'entamer une affaire, où il est important de réussir au commencement." Letter from M. Vautorte to Brienne, Aug. 12, 1650, in *Négociations Secrètes Touchant la Paix de Munster*, iii, 539.

² Letter, Vautorte to Brienne. Sept. 19, 1650, *Négoc.*, iii, 546.

³ He wrote to Brienne on August 14, 1653: "Notre contravention au Traité de Paix est manifeste and sans défense. Elle dure depuis trois ans & durera à l'avenir si'on ne fait un fond réglé pour l'entretien de cette Garnison & si outre ce fond on n'y met un Gouverneur fort sage qui empêche tous les désordres." *Négociations*, iii, 578.

could be given to a post on the frontier when the central government itself was in danger. Many of the great French nobles were in revolt; the Parlement of Paris had joined the opposition; Turenne, one of the ablest French generals, had deserted Mazarin and was leading Spanish troops. Under his direction the Spanish forces made such extensive incursions into French territory at the close of 1650 that Paris itself was in danger. Although Mazarin succeeded in beating back this invasion, he was not able to overcome the opposition in the capital, and he therefore decided to leave the country until order was restored. At the same time the March Compact was signed in Frankfort by the German princes, the real head of the French government was an exile in German lands, while a state of anarchy existed in Paris. The eclipse of French influence in the German empire appeared to be complete.

In proportion to the decline of French prestige in Germany the influence of Austria became more dominant. This does not mean that the German states came to share the Emperor's sympathy for the Spaniards; but a sense of weakness among the smaller governments and the mutual distrust¹ between the Electoral College and the other princes gave the opportunity for a strong power to assume the leadership in Germany. Ferdinand III took advantage of this situation to secure the election of his oldest son as his successor. He delayed convoking the Diet beyond the time specified in the treaties of 1648. In the meantime he called the eight Electors together in a special conference at Prague in the autumn of 1652, to consider the choice of his successor. The Elec-

¹ Since the peace of Westphalia the demand of the College of Princes for a share in the election of Emperor had become increasingly insistent. It was expected that trouble would arise over this matter in the first session of the Diet of 1648, for Ferdinand's successor had not yet been chosen.

tors were grateful for this recognition of their ancient rights which had been threatened by the College of Princes, and consented to choose the son of Ferdinand as King of the Romans. Two weeks after his formal coronation took place, the Diet was opened in Ratisbon, in May, 1653.

The power of the Emperor over the Diet was as great as it had been in the College of Electors. It seemed to the French representatives in Ratisbon that the Austrian Court¹ had never been more independent of the Diet and more completely in sympathy with Spain than in the summer and autumn of 1653. They said that it was probable that the Diet would obediently vote any sums which the Emperor might demand; that France had nothing to expect from the Diet, because, as a result of the disturbances at home, nothing definite could be offered in return. The Emperor was able to make his will supreme, partly by playing upon the fears of the weak, but largely also because he had the most to offer in the way of money and honors. "Present interests," wrote M. Vautorte, "have more influence upon the minds of men than the memory of good or evil of other days, or the hope for the future." He recognized that the Emperor had chosen precisely the right time² for the election of his successor and the session of the Diet, for it was Ferdinand's aim to render the latter helpless by fomenting dissensions within it.³ It is true that the French representatives duly presented

¹ Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, July 28, 1653, *Négociations*, iii, 569.

² "L'Empereur a bien pris son tems pour l'Election du Roi des Romains, & encore que la France eût été paisible & florissante elle auroit eu beaucoup de peine à l'empêcher; car il a gagné les Electeurs à Prague par les intérêts si puissans que nous n'avions rien de capable d'y résister. L'intérêt présent peut plus sur l'esprit des Hommes que le souvenir du bien, ou du mal que l'on a reçu autrefois, ni que la considération de l'avenir; de sorte que tous nos raisonnemens auroient été inutiles puisque nous n'avions rien de réel à donner." Letter, Vautorte to Mazarin, July 31, 1653, *Négociations*, iii, 571.

³ *Négociations Secrètes*, iii, 616.

memorials to the Diet of Ratisbon, calling attention to the violations of the treaties of Westphalia, but Vautorte had no hope of any action being taken upon these complaints. On the contrary, counter charges were made against France by the Estates of the Empire, and he was called upon to employ all his diplomatic skill to delay action on some of them which he acknowledged were well-founded. At the close of the year 1653 he was forced to admit his inability to prevent the levying of German recruits for the Spanish army,¹ even in the vicinity of Ratisbon, where the Diet was in session.

The Hapsburg party was not content with the destruction of French influence in the German Diet, but endeavored to create an active opposition to France with the purpose of recovering the territory lost in the Thirty Years' War. When the French envoy protested, in a personal interview with the Emperor in July, 1653, against the violation of the neutrality, the Emperor replied that many complaints against France were also coming in. M. Vautorte was compelled to admit the justice of the accusations against the garrisons of Philipsburg and Breisach,² who had been largely left to care for themselves by the French administration. Their ravages in the districts roundabout had called forth indignant protests, especially from the Marquis of Durlach and the Bishop of Spire. The representatives of the Archduke of Innsbruck at Ratisbon sought to increase and unite this hostile feeling, especially in the states in the vicinity of Alsace.³ Shortly

¹ "Ce sera matière pour crier, mais inutilement; car il nous est impossible d'empêcher que l'Empereur ne donne de semblables assistances au Roi d'Espagne." Letter from Vautorte to Brienne, Dec. 25, 1653, *Négociations Secrètes*, iii, 626.

² *Négociations*, iii, 559.

³ "Les Deputez de Monsieur l'Archiduc d'Inspruck ramassent de tous côtez des plaintes contre nous & sollicitent d'en faire tous nos voisins de l'Alsace afin d'aigrir les Etats contre la France, & les disposer à leur être favorables." Vautorte to Brienne, July 17, 1653. *Négociations*, iii, 562.

after this, M. Vautorte reported that the complaints against France were constantly growing; a few days later he wrote: "We are being attacked on every side; there is not an Article in the Treaty of Münster concerning France, which they are not trying to have set aside."¹

Although the influence of Ferdinand III was thus predominant in Germany during 1653, it was the abuse of this power which prepared the way for a change in public opinion and the restoration of the credit of France. The refusal of the Emperor to convene the Diet until the election of his son had been assured had given cause for dissatisfaction;² this discontent had been increased by the Imperial policy in the Diet, which sought to render that body absolutely impotent by playing off one party against another, although many affairs in the Empire demanded immediate attention. There was great need of reforms in the Constitution of the Empire as a result of the provisions of the treaties of 1648; the protection of the western boundary should be provided for at once; a call for aid had come in from Poland; the North German cities were suffering severely from the war between England and Holland. As it became evident that the Emperor cared little for the settlement of these questions, when men saw that the mission of Count Starhemberg to the Duke of Lorraine—ostensibly to demand the latter's withdrawal from the Empire—had been really a matter of form, intended only to reassure the Electors of Cologne and

¹ "On nous attaque de tous côtez & dans le Traité de Munster il n'y a aucun Article qui nous regarde lequel on ne tâche d'ébranler." Vautorte to Brienne, July 28, 1653, *Négociations*, iii, 569.

² "Les esprits vont s'aggravant de jour en jour & il n'y a point aparence que cette Diète produise aucun bon effet. L'intérêt de l'Empereur est de fomenter la division premièrement entre les Electeurs & les Protestans, & en second lieu entre les Protestans même." Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, November 27, 1657, *Négociations*, iii, 616.

Treves, when the demands of the Elector of Brandenburg¹ and the Protestants were refused by the Emperor and the Catholics in the Diet, dissatisfaction became general, most men lost all hope that the Diet would accomplish anything tangible, and the country seemed to be at the beginning of another religious war.²

By this time—the earlier months of 1654—Mazarin was sufficiently re-established in power to be able to take advantage of the German conditions, and he proceeded to do so with his customary adroitness. In February, 1653, he had returned to France from a second voluntary exile, and by the close of the year the last traces of civil war had disappeared in the provinces. He then turned his attention to foreign affairs in an attempt to regain the ground which had been lost during the Fronde. He won back the allegiance of the garrison of Philipsburg, who then expelled the Commandant, Count Harcourt, who had been treasonably negotiating with the Emperor to surrender the fortress. The effect of this re-establishment of French authority in Philipsburg was to still the opposition of the Bishop of Spire,³ who now approached the French envoy and asked to be taken under the protection of France. It seems also that the signs of returning strength on the part of the French government had a direct influence upon the tone of its representatives in Germany and of some of the German princes themselves. Early in January, 1654, the Elector of Cologne wrote directly to

¹ "Ich kann nicht absehen, was aus diesem Handel hier werden soll; die meisten Kurfürsten, fast alle Fürsten und Reichsgrafen sind disgustirt—selbst die Kurpfälzer ziehen stärkere Saiten auf." (Report of Blumenthal to the Great Elector. Quoted by Droysen, iii², 80, without date.)

² Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, August 14, 1653, *Négociations*, iii, 578.

³ Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, January 8, 1654, in *Négociations Secrètes Touchant la Paix de Munster*, iii, 631.

the Emperor, protesting against his un-German and unpatriotic policy, adding,¹ "It makes the average man believe that Your Majesty wishes only to please the King of Spain." At the close of January, M. Vantorte advised² his government that strong garrisons in Philipsburg and Breisach would assure France of the friendship of all the neighboring princes, for the Germans were, above all men, impressed by a show of force.

Mazarin³ took another step at this time which did much to re-establish French credit in Germany. The Spaniards and Lorrainers had taken winter quarters in Liege, which belonged to the territory of the Elector of Cologne. He had called upon the Emperor for help but had received only empty promises, and none of the other German princes except Brandenburg seemed disposed to come to his relief. Learning of the conditions in Liege, Mazarin sent M. Fabert, the governor of Sedan, to aid the Elector of Cologne with troops. With this assistance he was able to clear his territories of all foreign soldiers. The French intervention⁴ created a decidedly favorable impression on the German Diet, which was still in session; only the Saxon deputies expressed displeasure with what had been done. The others, especially the Elector of Mayence, who had been one of the bitterest opponents of France during 1653, had nothing but praise for the stand taken by France; even the Emperor admitted that he had no fault to find.

¹ Quoted in *Droysen*, iii², 91.

² Letter, M. Vantorte to Mazarin, January 22, 1654, *Négociations*, iii, 639.

³ Wilh. Arndt, *Zur Vorgeschichte der Wahl Leopolds*, in *Historische Aufsätze dem Andenken an Georg Waitz*, p. 569.

⁴ Letter, Vantorte to Brienne, Feb. 26, 1654, *Négoc.*, iii, 660. "Quoiqu'il en soit l'entrée des Troupes du Roi dans le Pais de Liège sera un très bon effet, car elle rendra les Princes plus hardis à y envoyer du secours."

This increase of French influence in Germany did not extend to the point of re-establishing France in the position she had held in 1648,¹ it simply placed her where she could effectually protect the privileges granted by the treaties of Westphalia. The Emperor was still in control of the Diet, and by the creation of numerous princes² among his own Austrian subjects he planned to make his power over the College of Princes absolute for a long time to come. The Elector of Mayence, though applauding the French intervention in Liege, was still strongly opposed to France; although he was High Chancellor of the Empire, he did nothing to redress the grievances of the Duke of Savoy, the ally of France, who reported that the promises made by the Emperor in 1648 were still unfulfilled. The French envoy complained directly to the Emperor because of the levying of troops in Germany by Spanish agents, but the Emperor calmly replied that France had the same right, inasmuch as the practice was forbidden neither by the treaties of 1648, nor by the laws of the Empire.³

The idea of leaguings with France occurred to some of the North German States at this early date, although the union that was forming on the Rhine had not yet considered such an alliance. Mazarin was interested in the plan and called upon M. Vautorte for a report as to its feasibility; but the latter decided that the project was not to be taken seriously,⁴ for the North German States were too timid to take the initiative

¹ Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, Jan. 29, 1654, *Négociations*, iii, 643.

² Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, March 12, 1654, *Négociations*, iii, 672.

³ Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, April 2, 1654, *Négociations*, iii, 682.

⁴ "Pour moi je ne crois pas qu'ils forment une Ligue, mais au plus des projets pour l'avenir, & de simples propositions; car ils sont timides, ils se défient les uns des autres, & craignent tous d'offenser l'Empereur." Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, March 12, 1654, *Négociations*, iii, 671. The states in question were Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick and Brandenburg.

in an action which would be so displeasing to the Emperor. He suggested, though, that secret negotiations be carried on with these states in order that the real strength of the movement might be ascertained after the dissolution of the Diet. During the session of the Diet the Elector of Brandenburg had vigorously supported the cause of the Protestants; for a time he also had seemed to favor some sort of an agreement with France, but as the close of the session approached it became evident that he had treated with France merely as a blind, to induce the Austrian Court to accede to his demands.¹ Contrary to the general expectation, the Emperor gave his consent to a plan for a league of German States in defense of the Empire, which was suggested not long before the Diet was dissolved.² The promise of support from the Emperor caused France to suspect the project, for Ferdinand could always prevent the use of the league against Spain, and therefore it would always be turned against France and her allies; pretexts for hostile measures the Emperor would soon find.

Although the Emperor's policy had been in the main successful up to the dissolution of the Diet, an event occurred within a few weeks which completely changed the situation. This was the unexpected death of Ferdinand IV,³ who had been chosen as Ferdinand's successor the preceding year. This event undid the work of years on the part of the Emperor and forced him, aged and ailing as he was, to take up again the arduous task of winning enough votes in the Electoral College to insure the choice of another Hapsburg. It was a particularly unfavorable time to take up the election of

¹ Letter, Vautorte to Brienne, April 2, 1654, *Négociations*, iii, 682. "mais je suis toujours du sentiment de ceux qui croient, que cet Electeur a voulu faire peur a l'Empereur pour faciliter quelques affaires qu'il a en cette Cour."

² Vautorte to Brienne, March 26, 1654, *Négociations*, iii, 678.

³ July 9, 1654.

a new Emperor, because Ferdinand's second son, Leopold, was still a minor; in addition to this, the general dissatisfaction, owing to the failure of the Diet, had created a strong anti-Hapsburg sentiment throughout the country. Brandenburg was irritated, Cologne was sulking, Bavaria and Saxony were uncertain because of changes in their administration.

Mazarin was quick to take advantage of the situation created by the death of Ferdinand IV. He filled Germany with agents working against the election of a Hapsburg Emperor. The able but unscrupulous Franz Egon von Fürstenberg was sent by the Elector of Cologne—though evidently in French pay—to urge the Elector of Treves to break away from the lead of the Elector of Mayence, who was one of the most active supporters of the Emperor. Fürstenberg asserted that, to gain his desired ends, Ferdinand was accustomed to make promises which he had no intention of keeping. The wily envoy also called attention to the danger in which Treves lay from Spain; he closed with the intimation that if the Elector was really attacked as a result of his abandoning Austria assistance might be expected from France.¹

The main object of the French diplomacy was to weaken the power of Austria, by the exclusion of the Hapsburgs from the Imperial throne. It was not so important to Mazarin who should win the coveted prize so long as the Emperor was not an adherent of the hated rival house. For a time Mazarin hoped to secure the honor for his young master, Louis XIV. The month following the death of the King of the Romans, he wrote to Servien² suggesting the candidacy

¹ Arndt, *Historische Aufsätze*, p. 571.

² "J'ai fait reflexion sur ce que vous me mandez touchant l'élection du roi des Romains, et je ne vois pas pourquoi le roi n'y pourroit pas songer pour lui-même. Mais c'est une chose de laquelle il ne faut pas parler, et je crois qu'avec un million d'or bien employé, on donneroit grand branle à cette affaire." Letter, Mazarin to Servien, August 24, 1654. Quoted in Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, ii, 141.

of Louis, but he urged that the matter be kept secret. Some months later he caused a pamphlet to be written by a Maître Silhon,¹ who openly advocated the choice of Louis XIV as the next German Emperor, both because he was more directly descended from Charlemagne than the Hapsburgs, and because France alone was in a position to defend the Empire against Spain. Mazarin had this pamphlet spread broadcast over Germany in the interests of the French candidacy; he had not given up the idea as late as 1657, if we may believe what he wrote in a secret letter to Gravel of that date.² It is not right, therefore, to dismiss the candidacy of the French king as a mere fancy on the part of his great minister. The persistence with which the idea was held shows that it had developed into a plan to be followed if conditions should prove favorable; however, it was undoubtedly subordinated to the broader policy of the exclusion of the Hapsburgs.

In this important undertaking France secured the active support of Sweden which had been aroused by the Austrian violation of the neutrality in sending assistance to Poland. Early in 1655, Carl Gustavus sent Count Schlippenbach into Germany to aid in the movement against Austria. He was favorably received in Berlin, and later went on to Bavaria. The attitude of the young Elector, Ferdinand Maria, was as yet uncertain, and the opponents of the Hapsburgs not only hoped to draw him into the opposition camp, but they desired

¹ Wilh. Arndt, *Aufsätze*, p. 572 (quoting Silhon): "dass die spanische Monarchie zu Grunde gerichtet sei, und diejenigen, so an ihrem hohen Noth und Gefahr leiden, bei Niemand anders als allein bei der Krone Frankreich Zuflucht suchen können und sollen."

² "Si néanmoins on pouvait voir jour à faire élire Sa Majesté, on élargerait pour cela la main bien davantage. Il faut faire làdessus la guerre à l'oeil, et si vous voyiez que les choses s'y puissent disposer, vous pourriez en laisser échapper quelque mot délicatement, et comme de vous même." Quoted by Chéruel, *Mazarin*, iii, 95.

that he should become their candidate for the Imperial crown. This proposition was not well received in Munich when made by Count Schlippenbach, for there was a strong Austrian party at the Bavarian court. The Electress Dowager was a sister of the Emperor Ferdinand, and the Elector's chief advisor, Count Kurz, was a brother of one of the leading ministers at Vienna. Very soon after the Swedish envoy had left Munich the Landgrave of Hesse-Homburg arrived in that city from Paris. He had also been commissioned to treat with the Elector concerning the latter's candidacy, but the proposal was once more summarily rejected. France and Sweden were not discouraged by these failures, for they believed that the crown would prove too tempting to be resisted, if Ferdinand Maria should be freed sufficiently from Austrian influence to follow his own desires, and especially if he should find a majority of the Electors to be in his favor. Therefore, both Fürstenberg and the Landgrave journeyed constantly among the Rhine Electors—urging, promising, threatening,¹ in the effort to win a majority of the Electors for the Bavarian candidacy before negotiations should once more be taken up directly with the Elector himself.

Meanwhile the Emperor had not been idle, and he was not without supporters in the Electoral College. One of the most active of these was John Philip of Mayence, High Chancellor of the Empire. In his letter² of condolence to

¹ Portmann reported from Frankfort to the Great Elector on June 18, 1655: "Fürstenberg hat sich auch vermerken lassen, es müsste mit der Wahl eines römischen Königs nicht wie bisher hergehen, sondern dahin gebracht werden, dass die Wahl vom Haus Oesterreich auf ein anderes vornehmeres Haus gebracht werde, welches zu fördern die Krone Frankreich eine grosse Summe Geldes beisammen hätte." Quoted from *Berlin Archives* by Joachim, p. 61.

² "Wie ich denn nicht absehen kann, warum bei nächstkünftiger Wahl es mit Eu. K. Majestät nunmehr ältesten Herrn Sohn einige Difficultät haben könne." Letter of July 14, 1654. Quoted by Arndt, p. 568.

Ferdinand on the death of the King of the Romans, the Elector had suggested the candidacy of the Emperor's second son, Leopold, although the latter was still young and undeveloped, and had been educated for the Church. The Elector Palatine, although so hostile to Mayence as to refuse to enter the same Union of princes with him, nevertheless joined him in supporting the House of Hapsburg, a policy which Charles Louis had consistently followed since his restoration to power in 1648. Although the Elector Palatine was the lowest in rank in the Electoral College, the Emperor was glad to court a continuance of his support by deciding in his favor certain questions which had been in dispute between the Palatinate and Pfalz-Neuburg.¹ Of the other Electors Treves was inclined to follow the lead of Mayence, and Saxony was as usual a faithful supporter of Austria.

The greatest diplomatic victory of the Emperor was won in the case of Bavaria. As we have seen, the young Elector was surrounded by Hapsburg sympathizers; and he had faithfully reported to Vienna the attempts of Sweden and France to induce him to become a candidate. Even though he had not listened with favor to the suggestion, the Austrian Court felt that there was danger of his ultimately being induced to seek the crown for himself, especially since the Electress, Adelheid of Savoy, was intensely French in her sympathies and very desirous of the honors of Empress. Scarcely had the Landgrave of Hesse-Homburg left Munich in 1655, therefore, when an Austrian mission appeared, headed by one of the leading Austrian counsellors, Count Kurz. He emphasized the danger to Germany from the ambitious projects of the King of Sweden, and showed the need in which Bavaria stood of Austrian protection. He finally succeeded in getting the Elector's promise, with certain conditions, to sup-

¹ Joachim, p. 92.

port the Archduke Leopold for Emperor. He thus effectually disposed of the danger of a Bavarian candidacy, for the promise was faithfully kept by Ferdinand Maria in spite of French blandishments; but France did not learn of this agreement until two years later, after many fruitless attempts had been made to induce the Elector of Bavaria to become a candidate for the crown.

In the midst of these diplomatic contests for the possession of the majority in the Electoral College, the plan for a Union of German princes continued in existence and was even developed. Indeed, the need of such an alliance was as great at this period as it had been at any time since 1648. The war between France and Spain continued, and the Imperial territory on the lower Rhine was still held by foreign troops. A strong body of Swedes was posted on the lower Weser and might advance farther into Germany at any time. Feeling their insecurity under these circumstances, the Electors of Cologne and Treves, the Bishop of Münster and the Duke of Pfalz-Neuburg entered into an alliance for the common defence at Cologne on December 15, 1654. This union was formed on much the same lines as that of 1651 had been, but it included Münster and Neuburg instead of the Elector of Mayence. When a notice of the formation of this union was sent to the Emperor, he hastened to reply, not only sanctioning the action, but promising his support in case of need. This attitude was quite different from that which he had taken in 1651,¹ but he now needed the support of Cologne and Treves in the approaching election, and he also feared a purely Protestant Union with a possible invasion from Sweden. The alliance of 1654 was not meant to be exclusively Catholic, for the Elector of Treves had suggested the admission of the Palatinate, Hesse-Darmstadt and Mayence. The first

¹ Joachim, p. 42.

two did not enter the Union, but the Elector of Mayence was heartily in favor of its purposes and he became a party to its provisions on August 11, 1655, thus bringing together the Unions of 1651 and 1654.

The Emperor desired that this league of princes might remain Catholic; he therefore supported the project of admitting Bavaria, which was considered during the closing months of 1655. The next year Ferdinand even offered to assume the leadership of the league himself. Such an arrangement would have been a great menace to France, and hence Mazarin repeatedly instructed Gravel to use every effort to induce both Protestant and Catholic princes to enter the alliance which was so slowly forming. He was supported in this respect by some of the German princes themselves, the most important of whom were the Palsgrave of Neuburg and the Elector of Mayence.¹ The motives of these two princes in so doing were entirely different, but they were united in a common opposition to Austria. The Elector of Mayence had been one of the most faithful supporters of the Emperor; but the latter's un-German policy had alienated John Philip, whose chief aim became, therefore, the formation of a confederation strong enough to maintain peace in the Fatherland. Ferdinand's offer to become the head of a great Catholic League served only to increase the Elector's distrust of Austria; to secure the established peace which he desired, he believed it was necessary to turn to the Protestant princes and to France. A compact of August, 1655, provided for just such an extension of the membership, but jealousy between Mayence and Cologne, between Brandenburg and Neuburg had made progress in that direction very slow.² In February, 1656, the Elector of Mayence wrote to the Landgrave William IV of Hesse—who had played a leading part

¹ Joachim, pp. 91-2.

² Joachim, p. 62.

in the formation of the Protestant Hildesheimer Bund of North Germany in 1652¹—and invited the members of that union to enter the League of the Rhine. Since he had not yet been completely won to the idea of an alliance between the League and France, he declared in this invitation that the confederation as planned would be powerful enough in itself to protect the Empire both on the North and on the West.

Mazarin was not satisfied with the exclusion of the Emperor from the League, and the admission of Protestants to it. He wished to bring the organization under French control and use it against Austria. To attain this end the German princes were given to understand by busy French agents² that the real power behind Austria was Spain, and that the Empire was in danger of being reduced to a state of subserviency to Spain, similar to that which had existed under Charles V. MM. Vignacourt and Gravel protested at various German courts concerning the Emperor's violation of neutrality in the interests of Spain. It is supposed that when they visited the Elector of Mayence in May, 1656, they also fully discussed the plan of an alliance between France and the League of the Rhine; at any rate, Mayence was from that time strongly in favor of such an alliance.³ The Emperor strove vainly to check this spread of French influence; and his death, on April 2, 1657, introduced a new phase in the development of the League of the Rhine. During the following year the negotiations for the election of Ferdinand's successor were to demand the most attention: the League was to be forced into the background.

The immediate result of the interregnum following the death of the Emperor was the outbreak of a bitter quarrel between the Electors of the Palatinate and Bavaria over the

¹ Christoph v. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, ix, 240.

² Chéruel, *Ministère*, iii, 79.

³ Joachim, p. 198.

Vicegerency of the Empire in Franconian lands.¹ The attitude of Charles Louis ever since the treaties of Westphalia had been one of sullen isolation. Smarting under the indignities which he had suffered in the loss of territory and rank as a result of the Thirty Years' War, he was ready to fight to regain every ancient right of his house which had not been expressly taken away by the treaty of peace. Therefore at the death of Ferdinand he claimed the position of Reichsvicar because it had been the acknowledged right of his forefathers, the Palatines of the Rhine. The Elector of Bavaria claimed, on the other hand, that Charles Louis was no longer holding the electorate of his fathers; he said that his father had received the electorate of the Rhine in the course of the Thirty Years' War, and therefore, the office of Reichsvicar belonged properly to him. Both princes posted proclamations² throughout the country in support of their claims. Their followers often tore down these rival placards; mutual irritation increased to such an extent that open hostilities were only narrowly averted.

At the death of the Emperor, the House of Hapsburg could rely upon only two electoral votes—those of Saxony and Bavaria,—and the latter was being constantly tempted by French offers. Brandenburg was still allied to Sweden, the Palatine had become estranged from Austria. It was the general opinion that Mayence had an understanding with France, and as the Electors of Cologne and Treves had been associated with him in the alliance which had been formed in 1655, it was probable that they would be to a certain extent

¹ *Theatrum Europaeum*, viii, 3.

² "Die zwischen denen beyden obgedachten hochlöblichen Kuhr-Häusern Bähern und Pfaltz entstandene Zwistigkeiten wegen der Reichsverwesung / wurden je länger je grösser / und suchte je eines dess anderen aussgegangene und Einladungen / durch öffentlich aussgelassene Gegen-Befehl unkräftig und ungültig zu machen." *Diarium Europaeum*, i, 327.

under his influence. When the news of Ferdinand's death reached Paris, Mazarin at once instructed the French representatives to urge the German princes to take advantage of the great opportunity which was thus offered to regain their freedom.¹ Just how this freedom was to be won appears from the propositions made by a French secret agent, Count Vagny, who went from Paris to the Elector of Cologne in May, 1657.² He said that the time had come when Germany should be ruled by a prince who was German at heart. Therefore since the Elector of Bavaria had proved to be unwilling to accept the crown, France would support the Duke of Neuburg—an energetic, ambitious prince who was in favor of the French alliance.³ Before promising to support this new candidate, however, the Elector of Cologne wished to await the outcome of another mission to Munich, which was just setting out under Wilhelm von Fürstenberg and the French envoy Boineville. It was also found that the Elector of Treves was opposed to Neuburg, and especially to the French alliance.

While these negotiations were going on during the early summer of 1657, Mazarin was arranging for an imposing mission to the German Diet at Frankfort. He chose as the French representative Marshal Gramont, an experienced soldier and a skilful manipulator of men, and Hugh de Lionne, a diplomat who had gained great credit as an envoy to Rome. In addition to representing France before the Diet, the French delegates were to take charge of the negotiations concerning the election of Emperor. They were instructed to leave nothing undone to prevent the choice of a Hapsburg candidate. If this could not be prevented, how-

¹ See Droysen, *Gesch. der preuss. Politik*, iii², 281 and Köcher, *Gesch. von Hannover*, i, 239.

² Henri Lonchay, *La Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p. 186.

³ Joachim, pp. 256-7.

ever, they were to endeavor to secure a Capitulation,¹ which would place so many restraints upon the Emperor's power that he would be unable to aid Spain against France, as his predecessor had done. They were to go even further, and and bring about, if possible, an alliance among the anti-Hapsburg princes for the purpose of executing the provisions of the Capitulation.

The French mission set out for Frankfort in August, 1657. The envoys were instructed to stop at Heidelberg on the way and secure the support of the Elector Palatine against Austria.² The task was rendered easier by the fact that Charles Louis had become estranged from Austria and was also in great need of money, which Mazarin was ready to give for a vote in the Electoral College. He sent out a delegation of Palatine nobles which met Gramont and Lionne two leagues from Heidelberg and escorted them with great honor into the city.³ Negotiations were at once begun, and after two days of sordid bargaining an agreement was effected. Charles Louis was to receive 40,000 crowns when the delegates reached Frankfort, 50,000 crowns at the beginning of the next year, and 40,000 crowns annually for three years. In return he gave a written promise to vote for the French candidate as Emperor. As Gramont and Lionne proceeded on their way to Frankfort they were met by Gravel,⁴ who reported

¹ A set of conditions imposed upon the Emperor by the Electoral College.

² In this connection mention may be made of a prophecy which gained credence among the Palatinate peasants at this time. According to this saying there were to be henceforth two Emperors, and one should be called Charles Louis. The Elector mentions the prophecy in a letter to his sister, Sophie of Hannover, June 3, 1658. *Publicat. aus den K. Preuss. Staatsarchiven*, xxvi, 5.

³ Gramont, *Mémoires*, in Michaud, *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires*, vol. xxxi, p. 288.

⁴ Gramont, *Mémoires*, xxxi, 289.

that Volmar, the Austrian representative, had attempted to secure their exclusion from the Diet, but had been defeated through the efforts of John Philip of Mayence. Arrived in the vicinity of Frankfort, the French were compelled to wait three days for fair weather in order that the solemn entry might be as impressive as possible, for they well understood the sway which French taste and display held over the German mind.¹ Finally, on Sunday, August 19th, the weather was all that could be desired. Early in the morning the French envoys attended divine services, and a hurried breakfast followed; then in splendid uniforms, with the glitter of silver and gold, the long cortege moved slowly into the old imperial city.

The next day MM. Gramont and Lionne paid a formal call to the Elector of Mayence, High Chancellor of the Empire. They delivered a personal letter from Louis XIV giving the reasons for sending the mission to the Diet.² The King called attention to the danger to Germany from the existence of war on every side, and asked that more vigorous measures be taken to preserve the peace; he declared his purpose to be the maintenance of the existing treaties. An-

¹ Es fünckelte und schimmerte alles von Gold und Silber / ja die Pferde / die Kutschen / die Maulthiere / die Treiber / die Lackeyen / die Hof-Junckherrn und die Herren und Knechte waren alle auff prächtigst / nach Frantzösischer Manier und Artlichkeit / aussstaffiret." *Theat. Europæum*, viii, 48. See also *Diar. Eur.*, i, 369-72.

² "Und sehen / dass jetzt neues Unwesen daselbst schwebt / wegen unterschiedlichen Kriegsheeren / die es allenthalben umgeben / also dass dasselbe Kriegsfewer / so schier in der gantzen Christenheit in hoher Flamme brennet / Teutschland abermal muss fürchten / wann man nicht durch kräftige und mehr fürsichtige Mittel / dann hiebevor geschehen / entgegen geht / und also verhindert dass die Punkten des so hochtheurlich gestifteten Friedens / und zu dessen Erwerbung Wir und Unsere Freunde kein geringen Theil / unsers von Gott vergebenen Vorthails gutwillig schwinden lassen / weniger vergewaltigt werden könnten." *Diar. Eur.*, i, 375.

other reason for the prompt communication of the envoys with the Elector is found in their instructions from Mazarin. Since John Philip had not yet taken a definite stand in the matter of the election of a new Emperor, Gramont and Lionne were, if possible, to win his support for the French candidate. They were to appeal to his patriotism and devotion to Christianity; they were authorized to make large promises in the name of France, and as a last resort, they were to threaten him with retributive action in case he did not oppose the election of a Hapsburg Emperor. It may be added that the principle expressed in these instructions was the one upon which all of the negotiations of Gramont and Lionne were conducted at Frankfort. Mazarin drained France of all available funds in order that sufficient money might be on hand to buy the influence of the German princes, for many of them were venal, with low ideals of patriotism.¹ Whenever the use of money proved unsuccessful, however, the French ambassadors fell back upon the threat of war and the restoration of conditions which had existed before 1648. It was with the idea of exercising a coercive influence upon Frankfort that Mazarin and Louis moved out from Paris to Metz,² on the French frontier, where the Court remained during the greater part of the autumn of 1657.

Not long after the arrival of Gramont and Lionne in Frankfort, the preliminary negotiations for the election of Emperor began.³ With French, Danish, Venetian, German—and later, Spanish representatives present, it seemed that a great European Congress was in session to consider the con-

¹ Gramont, *Mémoires* (ed. Michaud, xxxi, 285).

² Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii, 92.

³ "Hierauff nun fieng sich das Spiel an: Denn die Statt Franckfurt war für diesesmal gleichsamb wie ein Theatrum, oder Schauburg/worauß gantz Europa sein Interesse oder Angelegenheit abhandelte." *Th. Europæum*, viii, 53.

dition of the Empire. But it was contrary to the Golden Bull for other princes than the Electors to take part in the proceedings, and, in fact, affairs were soon in great confusion as a result of the many opposing interests represented. Nevertheless the French ambassadors made some progress in their campaign against Austria and Spain. In harmony with the expressed purpose of their mission, they presented a memorial¹ to the German princes, complaining of the Austrian violation of the neutrality while Louis had been consistently endeavoring to keep the peace. The Hapsburg representatives immediately replied that the pretended French friendliness for Germany was all a sham and that the King of France was really conspiring to control the election of an Emperor and to obtain possession of all the territories along the Rhine. Gramont and Lionne also requested the mediation of the Electoral College to secure peace between France and Spain. This proposal created a favorable impression, as had been intended; it was warmly supported by the Elector of Mayence,² who tried to interest Bavaria in the matter; but since the Spanish mission had not yet arrived in Frankfort, a postponement of the negotiations for the election of Emperor was taken in November to await the conclusion of peace.

While these events had been taking place in Frankfort, Mazarin had been making renewed efforts to induce the Elector of Bavaria to become a candidate for the crown. Early in October, also, Franz Egon von Fürstenberg³ was sent to Munich by Gramont and Lionne; but he took too

¹ "Die neulichst verstorbene Käys. Majest. wider ihren eigenen Wahl-Eydt / und wider den Münsterischen Frieden-Schlus / wie auch nachgehends / nach Ih. Käys. Majest. Absterben / die zu Ungarn Königl. Majest. dahin verleyten und vermögen können / gantze Armeen in Italien zu schicken." Manifest of Oct. 2, 1657, *Th. Eur.*, viii, 77.

² *Th. Eur.*, viii, 53.

³ Joachim, p. 291.

optimistic a view of the situation, possibly because he wished to make a favorable report to his employers. At any rate he gave it as his opinion¹ that Ferdinand Maria would ultimately accept the crown if it were offered to him. This conclusion was proved to be without foundation by the early arrival of instructions to the Bavarian representatives in Frankfort, absolutely forbidding the use of the Elector's name as a candidate. Lest any opportunity, however slight, to detach Bavaria from Austria should be neglected, Gramont himself went to Munich in December.² If it had been at all possible to incline Bavaria to the French policy, the Marshal would have succeeded, for in addition to his talent as a diplomatist he had the advantage of being intimately acquainted with Count Kurtz, and of having known the Elector's father during the Thirty Years' War.³ But it was of no use to promise Ferdinand Maria the crown, protected by the majority of the German princes and by France and Sweden. In vain did Gramont employ his subtlest flattery upon the young Elector: the Austrian influence proved the stronger and Ferdinand Maria remained true to the promise which he had made in 1655. When Marshal Gramont returned to Frankfort in January, he went with the conviction that the election of a Hapsburg Emperor could not be prevented.

A direct result of the failure of Gramont's mission was an estrangement of the French ambassadors from the Elector of Mayence.⁴ As early as December, when Gramont's first unfavorable dispatches had arrived from Munich, a marked coolness had become apparent between John Philip and

¹ Mazarin had received a letter from the mother of the Electress which contained the information that Ferdinand Maria would accept the Imperial crown if it were pressed upon him. Chéruel, *Ministère, de Mazarin*, iii, 106; Gramont, *Mémoires* (ed. Michaud), xxxi, 294.

² Chéruel, *Ministère*, iii, 106.

³ Gramont, *Mémoires*, p. 295.

⁴ Joachim, p. 351.

Lionne. The latter accused the Elector of treachery in holding out hopes of French success while secretly supporting Austria; he even threatened revenge on the part of France; and persistent rumors reported that Alsace was filling up with French troops.¹ John Philip protested that he had done his utmost to prevent an Austrian election, and that the majority of the Electors were even preparing to take steps against him for his subserviency to France. To soften the French resentment he suggested the conclusion of that alliance between France and the League of the Rhine which had been discussed before the death of Ferdinand III, for this would be the surest means of securing a capitulation which would render the future Emperor powerless to injure France. The French ambassadors, possibly from policy, were unmoved by the Elector's efforts for reconciliation; it remained for Mazarin, who fully appreciated the great possibilities in the plan of alliance, to reëstablish friendly relations between his representatives and John Philip.² He wrote to Lionne, urging him wherever possible to support the union suggested by Mayence; he sent his own secretary, Roussereau, to Frankfurt, with assurances of his entire confidence in the Elector. The French ambassadors then accepted John Philip's explanation of his conduct, and a complete reconciliation followed. At the grand banquet which was given in honor of the event, John Philip drank to the toast, "No further strife among brothers!"³ "From this time," says Joachim, "the admission of France to the League of the Rhine was assured."

Although the French ambassadors had pretended to be greatly incensed by what they called the perfidy of Mayence,⁴

¹ Ennen, *Frankreich und der Niederrhein*, i, 169.

² Chérueil, *Ministère*, iii, 107.

³ Non sit jurgium inter fratres!

⁴ "Befahl Mazarin seinen Gesandten, die Kälte, mit der sie dem Mainzer seit einiger Zeit begegneten, auch fernerhin zu zeigen." Pribram, p. 155.

it is unlikely that they were much deceived by the Elector, or were really surprised at the failure to prevent a Hapsburg election. Nevertheless, an excess of patriotic pride causes some German writers, notably Pribram¹—to place great emphasis upon the failure of the French to exclude the Hapsburgs from the throne and assert that it was to hide his discomfiture in this respect that Mazarin adopted the project of an alliance between France and the League of the Rhine. Pribram goes on to say that Mazarin really favored no such alliance, either in the case of the choice of a Hapsburg Emperor or in the event that the honor should go to a non-Hapsburg candidate, because the conditions imposed by the German union would probably have been directed as much against France as against the Emperor.² He concludes, therefore, that Mazarin's support of the alliance was no part of an established policy,³ and that he did not foresee the great advantages to France which lay latent in the League—advantages which did not become evident until after Mazarin's death. It is to be admitted that the attempt to prevent the election of an Austrian Emperor occupied the chief attention of the French ambassadors during the latter part of 1657; and that certain instructions from Mazarin to Gramont and Lionne took decisive ground against any sort of an alliance between France and the League, under either a Hapsburg or a non-Hapsburg Emperor. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that Mazarin had already negotiated for such an alliance during the life-time of Ferdinand III, and that it was merely a logical development from the provisions of the

¹ Alfred Francis Pribram, *Beitrag zur Geschichte des Rheinbundes* (in *Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-Historischen Classe der Kaisl. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Bd. 115).

² "Die Liga nicht weniger gegen Frankreich und Schweden als gegen das Haus Habsburg gerichtet ist." Quoted by Pribram, p. 144, as Mazarin's instructions to Lionne. Authority not given.

³ Pribram, p. 162.

treaty of Münster. Furthermore, the final instructions which Gramont and Lionne had carried away from Paris in July, 1657, had distinctly provided for the contingency of an Austrian election.¹ In that event the French envoys were to work for the formation of a league of German princes in order to limit the Emperor's power; Mazarin even stipulated the details of organization which would be acceptable to France.

The view that an alliance between France and the League during the reign of a non-Hapsburg Emperor would be detrimental to French interests is equally untenable.² Would the Duke of Neuburg or the Elector of Bavaria have been any stronger, any less dependent upon outside aid, would Austria have been any weaker in money, munitions and men, as a result of a mere coronation ceremony? Wherever the crown was bestowed, the relative power of France would have remained practically the same; it would have been as easy for Mazarin to dictate a policy to a non-Hapsburg Emperor, as it later proved to be in the case of the League of the Rhine. The contradiction³ between Mazarin's instructions of September, 1657, and his policy a few months earlier or a few months later, is explained by the fact that

¹ "Si cependant les électeurs veulent donner leurs suffrages à un prince autrichien ils devront, d'ailleurs lui lier les mains par des conditions rigoureuses et former une ligue qui en garantira l'exécution." Quoted iii, 98, of the *Ministère* of Chéruel, who had seen the original copy of the instructions.

² "Nur das scheint unerlässlich hervorzuheben dass Mazarin, so lange er noch irgendwelche Hoffnung hatte, die Wahl eines Nicht-Habsburgers durchzusetzen, in überhaus entschiedener Weise sich gegen den Abschluss der Allianz ausgesprochen hat." Pribram, p. 148.

³ "Nachdem ich das Projekt der Allianz das ihr mir eingeschickt habet, gelesen, fand ich mich in meiner Ansicht bestärkt, dass es uns sehr nachtheilig wäre, in dieselbe einzutreten." Mazarin's instructions to Gramont and Lionne, Sept. 15, 1657. Quoted by Pribram, p. 148.

these instructions were sent to Frankfort at a time when the Elector of Mayence was inclined to support a Hapsburg candidate; they were intended to influence his decision and hence need no more be taken literally as Mazarin's policy than do his oft-repeated threats of war.¹

The energetic support of the League of the Rhine was neither a reversal of policy nor a mask to hide the discomfiture of defeat. The aim of the French diplomacy was the humiliation of Austria, and the extension of French influence in Germany. The exclusion of the Hapsburgs from the Imperial throne was no more the only means to that end than the election of Louis XIV as Emperor had been. From the French standpoint* the exclusion of the Hapsburgs and the alliance between France and the League of the Rhine were both parts of one great plan, for Mazarin fully realized that a great diplomatist, like a great general, must always have several co-ordinated plans of campaign for the attainment of the one end; he himself said that "perseverance does not consist in repeating the same thing, but in constantly doing things which lead toward the same end."³

The choice of a Hapsburg Emperor having been assured by the refusal of the Elector of Bavaria to become a candidate, the chief interest was thenceforth centered in the *Wahlcapitulation* which was to be laid before the future Emperor.⁴

¹ See Příbram, p. 148.

² "C'est ici l'opinion assez commune—qu'en apparence on veut éloigner les Autrichiens de l'Empire; [mais en réalité] qu'on souhaite qu'ils [le] retiennent, afin qu'ils servent d'épouvantail à ceux qui autrement pourroient nuire." Quoted Chéruel, *Ministère*, iii, 114. from *Voyage de deux Hollandais à Paris*.

³ Chéruel, *Ministère*, iii, 86.

⁴ On January 11, 1658, Mazarin wrote to Lionne: "Si l'on persuade lesdits ministères du roi de Hongrie, ainsi qu'il est aisé de faire, que le but des Espagnols est d'allumer le feu dans toute l'Allemagne, et de la faire rompre contre nous, ils se porteront à consentir volontiers au conditions, par lesquelles on prétendra de lier les mains audit roi,

It was the French policy to impose severe restrictions upon his powers, in the interests of the preservation of German neutrality and of the maintenance of the treaties of Westphalia. It was certain that the Elector of Cologne and Charles Louis of the Palatinate would support this policy, equally certain that Saxony, Bavaria and Treves were devoted to the Austrian cause. It was necessary, therefore, for Gramont and Lionne to secure the support of Brandenburg and Mayence, the most independent and patriotic of the German princes. The reconciliation of January, 1658, made way for the adhesion of Mayence to the French plan for the Capitulation, and thus Brandenburg came to hold the deciding vote.¹ Although Friedrich Wilhelm signed a treaty of alliance with Austria against Sweden in February, 1658, he was not thereby brought into complete subserviency to Austrian policy. The interests of Austria and Brandenburg were very similar in North Europe, but the Great Elector was none the less aware of the danger to the Empire as a whole, from the selfish unpatriotic policy of the House of Hapsburg with regard to Spain. He was therefore inclined to support the French demands in the matter of the Capitulation, but realizing his position of advantage in holding the deciding vote, he delayed taking a definite stand. By so doing he was able to postpone the outbreak of hostilities with Sweden, for as long as his vote was uncertain he was courted by both France and Austria.² Gramont and Lionne gave large sums of money to his representatives in Frankfort, but did not succeed in hastening his decision.

devenu empereur, afin qu'il ne puisse rien faire de contraire à la manutention du traité de Munster." Quoted by Chéruel from *Affaires Etrg. Fr.*, 277, 16.

¹ Gramont, *Mémoires*, (ed. Michaud, xxxi, 298).

² "Jusqu'au jour de l'élection, le maréchal de Gramont et M. de Lyonne furent quasi toujours entre la crainte et l'esperance." Gramont, p. 299.

The Austrian and Spanish representatives in Frankfort carried on a vigorous campaign against the French influence in the Electoral College.¹ They attempted to win the vote of Brandenburg for a capitulation more favorable to the Hapsburgs. They also employed agents of the Catholic Church wherever possible, especially the confessors of the Electors of Cologne and Mayence.² Peñaranda, the Spanish ambassador, sought to discredit France by disclosing an agreement between Mazarin and Cromwell, by which the Protector was to attack Dunkirk, but the French were able to prove the existence of similar intrigues on the part of Spain, and in the matter of willingness to treat for peace they won an important diplomatic victory over Peñaranda, for they succeeded in throwing upon Spain the responsibility for the continued disturbance of the peace of Europe.³ We have already seen that the election had been postponed in the autumn of 1657 to await the outcome of possible peace negotiations between France and Spain. On September 10, the Elector of Mayence had written to Peñaranda,⁴ who was then at Prague, urging him to come to Frankfort as soon as possible in order that peace might be established before the election of Emperor was taken up. Peñaranda had replied that although he was in favor of the conclusion of peace, he could not take up negotiations for that purpose until after an Emperor had been chosen. On the arrival of the Spanish mission in Frankfort in March, 1658, John Philip again broached the subject of peace; Peñaranda claimed to have no authority to treat, but

¹ The French envoys replied with a repetition of the charges which they had made the previous autumn: "mit Ersuchen / dass denselben noch vor der Wahl möchte abgeholfen / und ein zukünftiger Römisch. Keyser zu Beobachtung derselben in der Wahl-Capitulation verfun den werden." *Theat. Eur.*, viii, 354.

² Gramont, *Mémoires*, p. 304.

³ Chéruel, *Ministère de Mazarin*, iii, 116.

⁴ *Theat. Eur.*, viii, 414.

he declared that if Mayence would agree to support a capitulation more liberal to Austria, he would do all in his power to reëstablish the long-desired peace. As Mayence could not make this concession, and since Peñaranda otherwise refused to grant a passport to the Elector's messenger to the King of Spain, the peace question was dropped until the Electoral College once more came together in April. The Electors then issued an address to the Kings of France and Spain requesting them to treat for peace.¹ The French king received the proposition cordially, but Peñaranda brusquely refused the offer of mediation made by Mayence and Cologne; he declared that an honorable capitulation must be granted the Emperor before he would consider the peace project. Whereupon the French representatives declared that since Peñaranda had made the peace dependent upon a wholly irrelevant matter it was obvious that Spain really did not wish the peace at all. By the use of secret agents they increased the irritation between the Elector of Mayence and Peñaranda to such a degree that any common action was out of the question.²

The arrival of Charles Louis of the Palatinate at the close of April completed the Electoral College, and made possible a resumption of the negotiations which had been discontinued in the previous November. Informal discussions during the intervening months had prepared the way for rapid action, and by the close of May the majority of the electors had practically agreed upon a set of conditions closely limiting the powers of the Emperor in the sense demanded by France.³

¹ *Theatrum Europaeum*, viii, 413.

² Gramont, *Mémoires*, p. 304.

³ "La capitulation est faite à notre satisfaction; il y a apparence que le roi de Hongrie l'observera, et en tout cas, la ligue qu'on prétend conclure avant l'élection l'y contraindra." Letter from Mazarin to French envoys in Germany, June 12, 1658. Quoted by Chéruel, *Ministère*, iii, 119.

After the Whitsuntide recess these conditions were incorporated into a formidable document of forty-seven articles. Article 4 provided that the Emperor should bestow Montferat upon the Duke of Savoy, as had been promised in 1648. Articles 13 and 14 bound the Emperor to respect the treaties of Westphalia,¹ and to grant no aid to the enemies of France. Through the influence of the Elector of Brandenburg it was also declared that France should have no right to aid the enemies of the empire or of individual German princes.² The Austrian party in Frankfort, much displeased with the severe conditions imposed by the capitulation, threatened to break off negotiations and leave the city.³ The Swedes were also dissatisfied because they received no protection against Austria similar to that granted to France. They attempted, therefore, to prevent the election until some provision of the sort should be incorporated in the capitulation.⁴ They were actively supported by Mayence, Cologne, and the Palatinate, and it seemed for a time that the Electoral College was so hopelessly divided that the election would be indefinitely postponed. But the Elector of Brandenburg threw his influence against the claims of his dangerous rival in the North, and the capitulation was adopted by the College as it had been first drawn up. Early in July King Leopold accepted the conditions as the best that could be obtained; according to ancient custom all strangers were

¹ "Nous observerons inviolablement—les choses, qui ont été traitées et conclues à Osnabrück et Munster, entre notre prédécesseur—nous ne fournirons aucunes armes, argent, soldats, vivres, ou autres commodités aux étrangers, ennemis de la couronne de France, présents ou à venir, sous quelque couleur ou prétexte que ce puisse être." Quoted in Chéruel, *Ministère*, iii, 119. See also *Theat. Eur.*, viii, 474. for all the articles, and Mignet, *Négociations*, ii, 14.

² Gramont, *Mémoires*, (ed. Michaud), xxxi, 309.

³ Joachim, p. 423.

⁴ *Theatrum Europaeum*, viii, 460.

then sent out of the city,¹ and on July 18th a formal session of the College in the old St. Bartholomew's Church declared Leopold of Hungary to be the German Emperor.

When the result of the election became known there was great rejoicing in the Spanish Netherlands over what appeared to be another Hapsburg victory. Mazarin had a far more accurate view of the situation,² for, as we shall see, he had already arranged for a junction between France and the League of the Rhine which would enforce that provision of the capitulation which forbade the Emperor to give any assistance to Spain. He was confronted by a real danger, however, in the prospect of a German-Swedish war,³ for Carl Gustavus was preparing to take by force what had been refused him by the Capitulation and the Rheinbund. He called upon France, as an ally, to join him in a war against Austria and Brandenburg—which would virtually renew the Thirty Years' War. This was exactly what Spain wished to bring about,⁴ but Mazarin was far-sighted enough to perceive that an attack on Germany by either France or Sweden would unite the Empire behind the Emperor in favor of Spain. He therefore rejected the Swedish proposals and refused to desert the German princes who had joined him in the League of the Rhine.

Coincident with the struggle over the Wahlcapitulation and in many ways dependent upon it, the negotiations for the formation of this League had been industriously carried on during the first half of 1658. The Elector of Brandenburg

¹ A provision of the Golden Bull. *Theat. Eur.*, viii, 560.

² He wrote to a friend: "Cette élection n'est pas si avantageuse qu'ils s'en doivent fort réjouir et leurs feux sont véritablement des feux d'artifice pour amuser les peuples." Quoted by Chéruei, iii, 121.

³ Gramont, *Mémoires* (ed. Michaud), xxxi, 309.

⁴ Mazarin wrote to Gramont and Lionne: "Peñaranda est persuadé, qu'il n'y a autre ressource aux affaires d'Espagne que celle d'allumer le feu en Allemagne." Chéruei, *ibid.*

had delayed proceedings because he was opposed to the admission of Sweden. On the other hand, Charles Gustavus postponed entering the union as long as the members declined to support him against Poland and Austria. The Elector of Mayence and the other promoters of the Bund hesitated to proceed without Brandenburg and Sweden, and yet no basis of reconciliation between them could be found. The French representatives were more successful in their effort to secure the admission of France to the League. At the time of the reconciliation between France and Mayence in January the plan was supported by Mayence, Cologne and Neuburg; they were shortly afterwards joined by the Dukes of Brunswick and by Hesse; and finally, when at the close of May the interested princes resolved to conclude the Bund without Brandenburg, the French were able to make their influence predominant. By the end of June the alliance with France was assured, although minor differences among the German princes and the threat of war by Sweden delayed the formal conclusion of the Bund and the attendant French alliance until after the coronation of the Emperor.

When the French ambassadors and other strangers were compelled to leave Frankfort during the formal election of the Emperor, those interested in the Rheinbund went to Mayence where they continued their deliberations. The German princes were the more desirous of seeing the long-discussed alliance an accomplished fact, because of the danger of war with Sweden; the French were likewise disposed to conclude the matter quickly because of the Hapsburg coronation just then taking place in the neighboring city. Hence little difficulty was experienced in reaching a decision; the agreement among the German princes was signed in Frankfort on August 14, shortly after the Emperor had left the city. The next day France was also received into the Bund.¹

¹ The treaty was signed by Lionne and Gramont for France. It

The German States forming this alliance were Mayence, Cologne, Pfalz-Neuburg, Sweden and Brunswick-Lüneburg. It was concluded for three years, and might be renewed at the expiration of that time. The way was left open for other States—both Catholic and Protestant—to join, and this was done in several instances. The purpose of the union was declared to be the common defense, and the maintenance of the treaty of Münster;¹ it was further stated that no offensive movement against either Emperor or the Empire was planned. In case of an attack upon one of the confederates, all of the members of the League were to aid him with troops, the contingents of the various states being carefully stipulated. The German princes promised to oppose all violations of the treaties of Westphalia detrimental to the interests of France, especially the passage through their territory of German troops destined for the Spanish armies.²

The League of the Rhine as finally formed did not include all the princes who had been prominent in the preliminary negotiations, or all those who from the location of their territories would naturally have been included in such a body. The Elector of Brandenburg wrote to John Philip of May-

provided "dergestalt / dass höchstged. Aller Christliche Königl. Maj. nebenst den alliirten Herren Chur-und Fürsten / über dem zu Münster und Osnabrück geschlossenen Frieden / wider alle desselben Aggressores und Ubertreter / halten / hingegen niemanden weder inn-nach ausserhalb dem R. Reich / mit solcher Bündniss beleidigen / noch die Chur-und Fürsten in den Spanisch-Frantzösisch Krieg mit einmischen." *Theat. Eur.*, viii, 569.

¹ "um sich und alle und jede Ihro von Gott anbefohlene im heiligen römischen Reich an Kur-und Fürstenthümern, Graf-und Herrschaften, inhabende Land und Leut bei dem westphälischen Frieden und dessen Genuss nach bester Möglichkeit zu schützen und zu vertheidigen, und daher in Zeiten solche Vorsehung zu machen, wodurch sie von sich und den Ihrigen allen gewaltsamen Ueberfall abwehren." *Londorp, Acta Publica*, viii, 417. Quoted *Ennen*, i, 170.

² *Mignet, Négociations*, ii, 15. Also, *Theatrum Europaeum*, viii, 561.

ence,² and to other princes, vigorously protesting against the formation of such an alliance. He said that he believed it would really endanger the peace of the Empire instead of protecting it. The Elector of the Palatinate, the Bishop of Münster, and the Elector of Treves also refused to join the Bund at this time.

In spite of its rather limited membership the Rheinbund was looked upon by most Germans as a great achievement and a long step toward the preservation of the peace of the Empire. Contrary to the claim of the Great Elector, the subservience to a foreign power did not appear to be a national disgrace or to be associated with special dangers, because French influence and French life were hardly more foreign to the Rhine region than the Hapsburg influence. At this period the French certainly seemed to be more disinterested than the Hapsburgs. France warded off from the Empire the war which both Sweden and Spain were so eager to begin. By causing to be joined together in one alliance both Catholics and Protestants, Mazarin strengthened the policy of toleration which had been adopted in 1648, but had been endangered during 1653 and 1654. On the other hand, the League of the Rhine was to France worth all that had been expended to obtain it. It cut off German assistance from Spain, and left that power in such a weakened condition that Mazarin was able to dictate the great peace of

² "Wann uns Eu. Libd. und anderer in diesser Alliantze begrieffener Chur-und Fürsten löblicher Eyffer/von Erhaltung dess Friedens/nicht genugsam bekant wäre, so wüsten wir gewisslich nicht/was wir von dem uns communicerten Aufsatz halten und urtheilen sollten in deme wir gar sehr beförchten/dass eins und andere so darinn begrieffen/vielmehr zu höchstgefährlicher Weitläufftigkeit und schädlicher Trennung im Reich/als Erhaltung Ruhe und Friedens/Ursachen gebe." Letter to Elector of Mayence, Sept. 25, 1658. Quoted from *Theat. Eur.*, viii, 573. See also Köcher, *Hannover*, i, 248, 266.

the Pyrenees. In Germany the Rheinbund at last gave France that position of predominant influence which had been presaged in the treaty of Münster. Furthermore, Mazarin made such good use of the Bund in succeeding years that the King of France became as much the Emperor of Western Germany as Leopold himself. It was only when Mazarin had passed off the scene and Louis was forming his own policies that this predominant influence was lost.

CHAPTER III

THE REGENERATION OF THE RHEINPFALZ

THE events described in the preceding chapters may be regarded as merely preparing the way for a more direct consideration of the conditions in the Rhine Palatinate during the Age of Louis XIV. The history of this little state was so intimately connected with that of its ruling family, and, furthermore, this Palatinate family was so closely associated with the greater dynasties of Europe¹ and with some of the principal events of the Thirty Years' War, that we may well begin with a short review of Palatinate history prior to 1650. The Pfalzgrafen, or palsgraves of the Rhine—as the Palatinate rulers were called—belonged to one of the oldest and most widely known noble houses in Germany. The Emperor Ruprecht had been chosen from among their number, in 1400. The Electoral dignity, or the right to a vote in the election of Emperor, had been hereditary in the family for generations. The Elector Palatine held first rank in the Electoral College and was, in addition a Reichsvicar, or one of the personal representatives of the Emperor during an interregnum. He also held a prominent place among German princes—as well as abroad—because of his strong Protestant sympathies and his acknowledged leadership of the Calvinist

¹ The Elector Charles Louis was a grandson of James I of England, father-in-law of the Duke of Orleans and an uncle of George I of England and Hanover.

party. Although his territory was limited,¹ it was one of the garden spots of Germany, and had become popular in song and story. Hence it did not appear beneath the dignity of so royal a personage as the daughter of the King of England to look with favor upon the suit of a Palatinate prince. The princess Elizabeth, daughter of James, was attracted by the pleasing personality of the young electoral prince Frederick who afterward became Frederick V of the Rhine. Since the princess was herself very popular in England her marriage to Frederick in 1613 was made the occasion of national rejoicing. The young couple took up their residence in the castle at Heidelberg in the picturesque Neckar valley; with games, hunting and pageants they led, for a short time, a life that was free from care.

Frederick would have been content to continue in the path of his fathers, remaining a simple Pfalzgraf; but Elizabeth was ambitious, and a small German state did not afford sufficient scope for her restless activity. An opportunity was soon offered to increase her rank and influence. In 1618 the Protestant subjects of the Emperor Matthias in Bohemia revolted because of his policy of repression, and chose Frederick of the Palatinate as King of Bohemia. Contrary to his own best judgment and the advice of many of the German princes, but pushed on by his ambitious wife, Frederick accepted the dangerous honor and set up his court in Prague.

¹ The district known as the Lower Palatinate included the electoral Palatinate, directly under the Elector's control, the principality of Simmern, the duchy of Zweibrücken, half the county of Sponheim, and the principalities of Veldenz and Lautern. Speaking generally, it occupied the Rhine valley between Karlsruhe and Coblenz, thus surrounding the bishoprics of Worms and Spire, and extended up the Neckar valley as far as Mosbach. The area of this irregular district was about 3,000 square miles; it had a population in 1786 of 305,000. Eva Scott, *Rupert, Prince Palatine*, pp. 3—. See also, Reiger, *Ausgelöschte Simmerische Linie*, pp. 66—.

But the tide of the Counter Reformation was already setting in stronger and stronger against the Protestant outposts; because of the unsettled conditions in Germany, the Protestant princes were unwilling to risk kindling a general religious war by a combined support of Frederick as a Protestant prince and as the head of the Protestant Union. The Protestants of Bohemia, after once choosing their king, gave him only a wavering and feeble support, while the puny forces of the Palatinate were as nothing compared with the support which the new Emperor, Ferdinand II, could draw from the Austrian dominions and from the Elector of Bavaria, who headed the League of Catholic princes. Hence, when Ferdinand once set out to recover the revolted territory, the result could not long be in doubt. The battle of White Mountain on November 8, 1620, although a mere skirmish, scattered the forces of Frederick, swept away the rule of the Winter King at one breath, and drove king and queen into headlong and humiliating flight. They went first to Berlin, but the Elector, for fear of offending the Emperor, granted them only a temporary refuge, although he was the brother-in-law of King Frederick. The unhappy sovereigns then made their way as royal vagabonds through one state after another until they reached the Hague, where they were cordially received and protected by Frederick's uncle, the Stadtholder Prince Maurice of Orange.

Meanwhile, the blaze kindled in Bohemia had continued to spread until it had become the general religious conflagration which the Protestant princes had sought to avoid by withholding support from the head of the Protestant Union. Frederick was outlawed by the Emperor for the part he had played in the Bohemian revolt, and his territory and honors were declared forfeited. In executing this decree, the Catholic army under Tilly and the Spaniards under Spinola completely overran the Palatinate and carried the war into the

adjacent Protestant states. The Protestant Union was dissolved by these Catholic successes; in the wake of the Catholic army a fierce and unrelenting Counter Reformation sought to bring lost provinces back into the Roman fold.

When Frederick V had accepted the crown of Bohemia, he had doubtless expected to receive support from England in his efforts to retain it. Parliament was ready to take up the cause of the Palatines, but James was opposed to aiding subjects in a rebellion against their lawful sovereign. Even after the Bohemian crown had been lost beyond recall, when the Palatines were in Holland, dependent upon the generosity of related and sympathizing princes for their daily bread, James did not make any vigorous attempt to secure the restoration of Frederick to his territory on the Rhine for fear of involving England in the great German war. He was content with fruitless negotiations with Ferdinand II for a restitution of the Palatines, and with allowing English mercenaries to enroll under Count Mansfield, the Protestant leader. The popularity of the Queen of Bohemia in England and Holland—she was known as the Queen of Hearts—inspired many individual admirers to join the Protestant armies in Germany in the hope of regaining the lost Palatinate territory. But this irregular support was of no avail against great Catholic armies. Year after year the homeless king and queen waited in Holland, dependent upon charity for their support. Their helpless condition was aggravated by the fact that Elizabeth's light-hearted, pleasure-loving disposition led her into extravagance, and in spite of liberal grants received from the Dutch States, from the English Parliament and personal friends, the Palatines were constantly in want. King Charles I even went so far as to raise money on his own jewels in order to aid his unfortunate sister; but he did not venture to interfere in the war any more directly than his father had done. Hope at last ap-

peared in another quarter, however, with the successes of Gustavus Adolphus, and Frederick set out from Holland in 1631 to take possession of the Pfalz. Unfortunately, the sudden death of the Swedish king at Lützen destroyed the opportunity to regain the Rhine territory, for very soon after the death of Gustavus, the Swedes were forced back by the Imperial armies. Frederick was not able to endure this last disappointment, and he died at Mayence without having returned to Holland. He left to his helpless family the hopeless task of regaining the lost possessions.

By the death of Frederick V the Palatinate leadership devolved upon his oldest son Charles Louis, a rather sober and melancholy prince of fifteen years, who had lived almost his entire life as an exile. He had always been left to the tender mercies of tutors, for his pleasure-loving mother gave more attention to her monkeys, parrots and dogs, than she did to her children. However, Charles Louis had received an excellent education in Holland, and the misfortunes of his family had taught him courage and self-reliance. Although still only a mere boy he set his face steadfastly toward regaining the lands on the Rhine. With the active participation of France in the great conflict in 1635, he went to England in company with his younger brother Rupert, in order to find means for the recovery of the Palatinate. King Charles received his nephews cordially and personally contributed £10,000 to the enterprise. He also sent a circular letter to the churches throughout England, calling for special services and contributions to support the movement for the recovery of the Protestant lands. In June, 1637, the brothers returned to Holland¹ and gathered together about four thou-

¹ The Queen of Bohemia then approached her sons with the request that part of the money received in England should be used to pay her debts. Charles Louis replied: "Methinks that should only be kept for a push, and for the good of the family." Warburton, i, 78.

sand troops, mostly inefficient mercenaries, the wreckage from many shattered armies. They were poorly organized and they lacked supplies, but Prince Rupert showed his military talent, even at that early age, by creating at least a semblance of organization in the heterogenous mass. Finally, in 1638, the two princes set out from Wesel with this weak force, in the forlorn hope of winning back the lands of their fathers from the veteran and vastly superior forces of the Emperor. They did not attempt to co-operate with the Swedish commanders, but made their way across the bishopric of Münster in the direction of the Palatinate. When they reached Lemgo, near Minden, they were overtaken by the Imperialists under Hatzfeldt and totally defeated.² By great exertions Charles Louis managed to escape, but Rupert was taken prisoner and placed in close confinement by the Emperor. The Palatine princes made no other attempts to interfere directly during the Thirty Years' War. In 1639 Charles Louis sought to win the support of Bernhard of Weimar, who with a strong army was attempting to regain the territory which he had lost by the battle of Nördlingen. Richelieu heard of the Palatine's plan and defeated it, for he wished the German mercenaries of Bernhard for the French service. He could make much more liberal offers than could the landless Palatinate prince; then, too, he took the precaution to have Charles Louis (who was in Paris at the time) delayed by a false arrest until Bernhard had for a certainty been won to the French service.

When it became evident that nothing could be gained from a direct participation in the German war, the Elector Charles Louis directed his efforts to another quarter from which he hoped indirectly to obtain means to come into his own. In the struggle which was just then beginning between

² Eva Scott, *Rupert, Prince Palatine*, p. 40.

King Charles and the English Parliament, he took sides with the Parliament. In August, 1644, he went to England from Holland, and addressed a letter to the Parliament commending its opposition to the King.¹ He deprecated the action of his brother, Prince Rupert, who had become one of the staunchest supporters of Charles I. The Elector made a further bid for favor in this letter by alluding to certain "Popish schemes hammered out on Jesuitical anvils." He professed his own godly regard for the Protestant religion and for the Covenant. The letter also included a request for the continuation of the pension which he and his mother had enjoyed under King Charles. Parliament was glad to receive the approaches of the Elector Palatine, for princes were a rarity in the Roundhead party.² In May, 1645, an annual pension of £8,000 was voted to the Elector, and in the following year further grants were made to him and his mother. According to some, there is little doubt that Charles Louis was planning at this time to succeed his uncle on the throne of England³ if occasion offered, and he therefore lost no opportunity to create a sentiment in his favor. But the continuance of the Kingship in England became more and more improbable, and the peace negotiations in Germany took such a turn that he at last directed his attention away from England and back to the Rheinpfalz again. The peace conferences which had been sitting for many years at Osna-brück and Münster finally decided, among other things, that Charles Louis should be restored to only a share of his father's territory—the Lower Palatinate—and that an eighth electorate should be created for him. The Duke of Bavaria was to retain the Upper Palatinate and the electoral rank conferred upon him by the Emperor Ferdinand II, in 1623.

¹ Bulstrode Whitelocke, *Memorials of the English Affairs*, pp. 81, 97; Warburton, *Memoirs of Prince Rupert*, iii, 24.

² Whitelocke, *ibid.*, p. 139.

³ Warburton, ii, 342.

The Elector Charles Louis determined to be satisfied for the time being with half a loaf, trusting to time and diplomacy for complete restitution of his rights. In December,¹ 1648, he sent orders from London to his uncle Louis Philip to take possession of the Palatinate in his name, and to begin at once to restore as completely as possible the old governmental system as outlined in the accounts of men who had once been Palatinate public servants. A fortnight after the execution of King Charles,² in February, 1648, the Elector applied to Parliament for permission to leave England to take up his lands on the Rhine. He also asked for a continuance of his pension until his affairs on the continent could be set in order, on the ground that all his misfortunes had come from the stand which his family had taken for the Protestant religion and for public liberty.³ The pass was at once granted by Parliament and a committee was ordered to accompany the Prince Elector as far as Gravesend. The pension was continued and all arrears were ordered paid. With a small guard the Elector crossed to the continent and made his way across Holland to Cassel, where arrangements were concluded for his marriage with Charlotte, daughter of the Landgravine of Hesse. From Cassel Charles Louis went to the council of princes held at Nuremberg to supervise the execution of various provisions of the treaties of Westphalia. His attention was there directed to securing the removal of the Swedish and Spanish troops, which still held various posts in Palatinate territory. The former were withdrawn largely through the influence of the Elector's cousin, Charles Gustavus of Zwei-Brücken,⁴ but the Spaniards held firmly to Frankenthal, for the war with France still continued. While at Nuremberg, Charles Louis also sought support among the

¹ Ludwig Häusser, *Gesch. der Rheinischen Pfalz*, ii, 580.

² Henry Cary, *Memorials of the Great Civil War in England*, ii, 119.

³ Whitelocke, *Memoirs*, p. 376.

⁴ Häusser, *ibid.*

German princes for his claim to all the rights and territory which his father had held before the Thirty Years War. He did not succeed in securing such support, and was compelled to be satisfied with merely the Lower Palatinate, as provided in the treaty of peace. He declared, however, that his action in accepting the smaller portion should in no degree invalidate his claim to the Upper Palatinate as well.¹

In October, 1649, the newly restored Elector set out from Nuremberg to take possession of his territory, which he had not seen for thirty years. He had been taken away from the Palatinate as a small child² when his unfortunate father had so light-heartedly embarked upon the Bohemian adventure. He was now returning, a mature man, to gather together the wreckage left by the long war.³ He first entered his own territory at Mosbach, where he was received with great joy by the remnant of his people. He attended divine service in honor of the new period just opening for his native land, and pushed on to his capital city—Heidelberg on the Neckar. There he received from the Bavarian representative on October 14, the formal cession of the entire Lower Palatinate, which had been held by the Duke of Bavaria since 1623. With the territory he received all the rights and dignities⁴ which his father had held, and thus he was free to begin that Regeneration of the Palatinate on which his fame rests. He found that the country had under-

¹ "Mais c'étoit toujours avec des protestations de ne pas faire préjudice à son droit." Gramont, *Mémoires* (ed. Michaud), vol. xxxi, 289.

² See Erdmannsdörffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, i, pp. 60—, for a sympathetic estimate of the Elector Charles Louis.

³ Häusser, ii, 582.

⁴ "Mit allen geistlichen und weltlichen Gütern, Rechten und Zubehör, welche vor der böhmischen die Kurfürsten von der Pfalz in Besitz gehabt." Quoted by Hanser, p. 227. Karl Friedrich Hanser, *Deutschland nach dem Dreissigjährigen Kriege*.

gone fully as great changes during the long war as he himself had done.¹ Including as it did the valleys of the Rhine and Neckar, one of the most fertile regions of Germany, it had been a constant attraction to the needy and greedy armies of the period. The ravages of three decades had turned the garden into a desert, and reduced the population to one-fiftieth of its normal magnitude.²

Since the attempt of the Pfalzgraf Frederick V to obtain the crown of Bohemia had been the direct cause of the outbreak of the war, his own territory—the Palatinate—had been compelled early in the conflict to submit to Spanish and imperial armies. We have already had occasion to notice the wide conquests of Spinola and Tilly immediately following the disastrous battle of White Mountain; but the Palatinate had experienced far more than a territorial conquest with the consequent destruction of property and alienation of allegiance.³ The Jesuits and Franciscans, who had poured into the country in large numbers after the Catholic conquest, had instituted a merciless system of proselyting which had resulted in what the Papal Nuncio, Caraffa, called the “Blessed Resurrection of the Palatinate.” Pastors were required to renounce the Protestant faith on pain of expulsion from the country; they were threatened with death if they should return after being once expelled. Public officials were “converted” by threats of dismissal from office. Large numbers of the people were forced into the Catholic church by the refusal on the part of the authorities to grant them—as Protestants—the rites of burial, of the Lord’s Supper and of baptism. The same end was gained by threats to

¹ Häusser, *Rheinpfalz*, ii, 665.

² The estimated losses in the duchy of Würtemberg, one of the nearest neighbors of the Palatinate, were 118,692,864 gulden, or more than \$40,000,000. Hanser, p. 229.

³ Hanser, p. 162.

drive all faithful Protestants out of the country. There had been an improvement of conditions during the period of Swedish successes, but the returning prosperity had been checked by the untimely death of Gustavus Adolphus. Shortly afterwards the Swedish army was completely crushed at the battle of Nördlingen in 1634, and large bodies of disorganized and irresponsible soldiers were forced back upon the territory along the Rhine. The Swedish troops of 1634 were entirely different from the praying, self-denying soldiers who had come into Germany with Gustavus Adolphus.¹ Their ravages in the Palatinate and neighboring districts at this time were as ruthless and far-reaching as those of the bitterest enemy of Protestantism could have been.² They stripped the country so completely of the means of sustenance that a famine at once broke out. People were forced to eat the hides of cats, dogs and even rats; many turned to grass and roots to appease their hunger, while others starved outright and their bodies were left exposed in the fields. In some places the famine was so terrible that people killed each other for food,³ and sometimes the authorities were even forced to place the burying grounds under guard. The famine was accompanied by a pestilence which was especially fatal in Worms. These were the conditions which existed in a fertile country, which could have supported a numerous population in prosperity.

The misfortunes of the Palatinate had not come to an end with the Swedish ravages, however; French and Imperialist armies occupied the Rhine territories in turn during the last

¹ Hanser, pp. 163, 164.

² "Das war die Zeit, wo man an den Ufern des Rheins, des Neckars und der Elz Verhungerte liegen sah, mit Gras oder Wurzeln inq Munde." Quoted, Hanser, p. 170, from S. F. Gehres *Pforzheims Kleine Chronik*.

³ J. G. Rieger, *Beschreibung von Mannheim*. Quoted, Hanser, p. 168.

decade of the conflict, according to the ebb and flow of the tide of war, and each commander, in accordance with the usage of the time, not only sought to make the land support his army, but allowed all sorts of exactions to be made upon the helpless population.¹ The case of Landau² is typical of what occurred in many places along the Rhine during these years. This city was forced to receive and maintain a strong garrison from 1636 until the close of the war, with the result that the entire region roundabout was impoverished; the houses went to ruin; the people became degenerate and depraved. The garrison furnished no protection to the community; bands of vagabonds, the wreck of what had once been a prosperous, peace-loving population, wandered about the country, killing and robbing, destroying everything destructible which came in their way. The ministers and other leading citizens of Ladenburg³ were taken, beaten, and otherwise ill-treated, and were able to regain their freedom only on payment of a ransom. The Spanish and Italian mercenaries of the Emperor practiced the most terrible cruelties upon those who fell into their hands. For example, it was their custom to shoot into the knees of their captives and then twist the lower portion of their legs off. They baked young children in heated ovens; they threw dead animals and even

¹ The following so-called Soldiers' Canon will give some idea of the conditions in Germany at the time:

Der ist des Teufels der barmherzig ist,
 Der ist des Teufels, der nicht tödtet,
 Der ist des Teufels, der nicht alles nimmt,
 Der ist des Teufels, der betet,
 Der ist des Teufels, der nicht fluchet, saufet, huret,
 Der ist des Teufels, der in die Kirche geht, etc.

Quoted by Hanser, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 238.

² J. G. Lehmann, *Landau in der Pfalz*. Quoted by Hanser, p. 169.

³ Chr. Th. Schuch, *Gesch. von Ladenburg*. Quoted by Hanser, p. 168.

arsenic into the springs. Finally, when at the close of the war, the Imperialists were driven back and Turenne broke into the Palatinate, the French commander simply continued the policy of devastation by plundering Pfortzheim, Durlach, Ottlingen, Lichtenau, and many other places.

Charles Louis was not discouraged by the unfavorable prospect before him, however, when he recovered his territory in 1649. True, the Palatinate vineyards were untilled and the fields were overgrown with brush, which had become the haunt of wolves; the industries at Mannheim, at the junction of the Neckar and the Rhine, had been rooted out, the great castle at Heidelberg was a complete ruin;¹ the university had been closed and the priceless treasures of its library had been carried away to Rome—and yet, the Elector turned resolutely to his task of restoring the blessings of peace and prosperity to his country. As one of the greatest needs of the Palatinate was an immediate and considerable increase of population, he took steps to induce immigration.² He sent out proclamations which not only promised a restitution and increase of former rights to all Palatines who would return to their native land, but also the broadest political and religious liberty to all incoming foreigners. This move had the desired effect, for the close of the war had left large numbers of men unattached, with no particular allegiance or home. The Elector's call was followed by a strong influx of colonists into the tempting territory along the Rhine.³ From Switzerland, France, Holland, England and the German states they came, with different languages and religious beliefs. The Anabaptists and the Sabbatarians were welcomed and the

¹ "Memoirs of Sophie of Hanover," p. 44, in *Publikationen aus den K. Preuss. Staatsarchiven*, ed. Dr. Adolf Köcher.

² Hanser, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 227.

³ Häusser, ii, 586.

Elector would also have admitted the Unitarians, had it not been for the danger of irritating the Emperor. Many of these colonists flocked into Mannheim,¹ which Charles Louis reëstablished with the object of making it the center of trade on the Upper Rhine. The government of the city was based upon that of the communes of Holland; there was at first absolutely free trade and freedom of industry, "as in Holland or in any other free country in the world"—according to the statement in the charter which the Elector gave the city. He granted special privileges and liberal terms to persons who would undertake to introduce new industries such as glass-making, silk and linen weaving.²

The Elector early adopted the policy of personally supervising the administration of all affairs in his little state, and this plan was nowhere more fully carried out than in the field of finance.³ The impoverished condition of the Palatines who still remained in the country at the close of the war, and the numerous privileges and immunities granted to incoming colonists, made it imperative that the burdens of government be made as light as possible.⁴ Charles Louis met the difficulty by a rigid economy, and by a careful distribution of those taxes which were levied. Thus, when light import duties were laid upon foreign wines, fruits and meat, and a delegation of ministers and professors asked to be excused from paying them, he refused, saying that all citizens must bear the costs of government alike. He took charge of the forests and the wild game of the Palatinate, and succeeded in obtaining a tidy sum from their administration, which he turned into the public treasury. For those who were fond of

¹ Erdmannsdörffer, i, 433-4.

² Johann Becker, *Politische Diskurs*, p. 437.

³ Häusser, *Rheinpfalz*, ii, 585, 684.

⁴ In 1669 the entire cost of government and foreign representation was 18,000 gulden.

hunting, he set bounties upon wolf-scalps,¹ which were to be taken from the packs which roved through the deserted fields.* He introduced the culture of tobacco into the Palatinate, and at about the same time the potato was brought by fugitives from France. Indian corn,³ or maize, was brought from Italy and was for a long time known as Welsh corn, from its foreign or "Welsch" origin. Charles Louis made generous grants of land to encourage the introduction of the mulberry tree. To stimulate the rebuilding of the cities and the recovery of the fields he issued a set of ordinances at the very beginning of his rule.⁴ It was there provided that he who planted fields which had lain neglected, should be free from all taxes for one year; but he who subdued an entirely waste district should be free for three years; while those who planted new vineyards were to be called upon for no further contribution to the state for six years. Likewise, the repairing of an old house brought immunity from the house tax for two years, and the building of a new dwelling extended this period one year longer. So successful was this policy of regeneration and upbuilding, that the fertile little country speedily recovered from the effects of the great war. When the French Marshal Gramont visited Heidelberg in 1657, after an absence of ten years, he scarcely knew the country, because of its improved appearance. He said in his *Mémoires*,⁵ "The surprise of the Marshal 'was not slight, for he found [the Elector's] land cultivated, his villages rebuilt, and

¹ Häusser, ii, 664.

² Erdmannsdörffer, i, 432.

³ Johannes Scherr, *Deutsche Kultur und Sittengeschichte*, p. 283.

⁴ Ordinance of May 7, 1650; Hanser, p. 227: "Wer alte Häuser reparire, solle auf zwei Jahre, und wer neue baue, auf drei Jahre von jeder Häusersteuer frei sein; der wüste Felder urbar mache, habe ein Jahr frei von Abgaben vor sich; wer gänzlich verwilderte Plätze umrode, sei auf drei, wer Weinberge anbaue, auf sechs Jahre von jeder Auflage durchaus entbunden."

⁵ Ed. Michaud, xxxi, 288.

his castle splendidly furnished. Heidelberg and the whole state were as thickly populated as if there had been no war."

Charles Louis was not personally extravagant, and he made very slight demands upon the public treasury for himself and his court. He had had a broad enough training, and was naturally independent enough to be almost entirely free from that servile imitation of Versailles¹ which was almost universal among the German princes at this time. Therefore, he did not undertake enormous building enterprises which swallowed up all the available resources of the country; there were no extravagant sums expended upon a circle of mistresses and an army of gay and dissolute courtiers. Indeed, Charles was a bourgeois in his enjoyments, and delighted to be with his people in their festivals and fairs. Sometimes, it is true, he made a more lavish display at the sessions of the Reichstag than either the size or the wealth of his state would warrant,² but that was rather for the purpose of maintaining the ancient dignity of his house than of gratifying his own personal vanity. So averse was he to admitting that the rank of his family had changed that he even borrowed money of the cities through which he passed on his way to the Diet of 1653, in order to be able to make the proper appearance before the Imperial assembly.

The Elector Charles Louis showed as careful consideration for the religious regeneration³ of the Palatinate as he did in purely economic matters.⁴ As early as December, 1649, he

¹ "The Prince Elector Palatine hath no particular favorite, but favour-eth all of worth or birth, himself governing his states, revenues and court, judiciously, frugally, splendidly." "Letter of Intelligence" from Utrecht, March 16, 1657. John Thurloe, *State Papers*, vi, 99.

² On his entry to Frankfort for the Kaiserwahl of 1657, his train was made up of 55 different divisions. *Theatrum Europaeum*, viii, 369.

³ Häusser, *Rheinpfalz*, ii, 594.

⁴ "The prince elector Palatine takes extraordinary care to settle his university and senate ecclesiastical." Letter "from the Rhine," Oct. 27, 1655. No signature. John Thurloe, *State Papers*, iv, 89.

reëstablished the *Kirchenrath*, or Council, for the supervision of the religious affairs of the country. Although only one-tenth of the regular number of ministers still lived in the country, the recovery of Calvinism was very rapid. In 1652 the Elector adopted the Ordinance¹ of Frederick III as his own; but Charles Louis was something more, or less, than a Calvinist; his indifference to confessional forms gave him an attitude of great breadth and toleration, and caused him to favor all plans for the union of warring sects. In 1656 he appointed a commission to discuss the prospect of union, and this body sat in Heidelberg for several years. He himself founded the Lutheran Providence Church in Heidelberg, and opened his territory to persecuted and fleeing Mennonites, Huguenots and Anabaptists. Finally, at the close of his life he saw a great advance toward the realization of his ideal in the consecration of the so-called *Concordien-Kirche*, or "Church of Harmony," in Friedrichsburg. In the dedication exercises, nine Catholics, nine Lutherans, and nine Calvinists took part.

With characteristic German love for education, Charles Louis began the restoration of the *Volkschulen* and *Gymnasien* very soon after his return to Heidelberg. Although hampered by the lack of funds and efficient teachers, he did not hesitate to plan for a complete restoration of the educational system as it had existed in the Palatinate before the Thirty Years' War. He devoted a great deal of attention to the university in Heidelberg,² which had been discontinued since 1630. By a careful selection of teachers, he soon brought it back to its high standard and restored its reputation. In July, 1651, the university archives were brought back from Frankfort, where they had been taken for safe

¹ Recognizing the Heidelberg Catechism as the Articles of Faith.

² Erdmannsdörffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, i, 434.

keeping by a friend of the university. In September the Elector sent out a proclamation announcing the resumption of work in the university, and on November 1st the session was formally opened. Such teachers as Freinsheim, Fabricius, Spanheim, Cocceji and Bökelmann lectured in Heidelberg during these years. Samuel Pufendorf labored there from 1661 to 1668, and while there wrote his famous *Monzambano*. In 1762 the Elector granted equal privileges to all confessions in the university. He even sent a call to Spinoza to become a professor at Heidelberg, promising the great philosopher absolute freedom in his teaching, as long as he would respect the recognized religion of the Palatinate. Spinoza did not accept the offer, because he believed himself safer in Holland, and also because he had never prepared to do university work.

Difficult as was the task¹ which Charles Louis had before him in the regeneration of his country, it was made more so by troubles within his own family. On February 12, 1650, he had married Charlotte, daughter of the Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel.² The Electress proved to be of a cold, haughty nature, who had married Charles Louis in accordance with her mother's wish, and not from any interest which she felt in him. After attempting in vain to secure her affection, the Elector transferred his attention to one of her maids, a very attractive girl by the name of Louise von Degenfeld. This intimacy caused a violent quarrel between the Elector and Electress, in which Charlotte is reported to have boxed her lord's ears. At any rate she soon afterward returned to her mother in Cassel, leaving her two children, Elizabeth Charlotte and Charles, with their father in Heidelberg. The Elector then went through a form of marriage with Louise

¹ *Theat. Europaeum*, iv, 1198-1200.

² Eva Scott, *Rupert, Prince Palatine*, p. 289.

von Degenfeld, but this ceremony was invalid because he was unable to secure a divorce from Charlotte.¹ At about the same time an unfortunate quarrel with his brother, Prince Rupert, caused the latter to turn his back upon Heidelberg, swearing that he would never enter the Palatinate again.

Rupert's bitterness toward the Elector was shared by his sister Elizabeth, for Charles Louis had refused to pay certain claims which they advanced against the Palatinate, as children of Frederick V. They were joined in their complaints by the needy Queen of Bohemia, while the Elector was loyally defended by his younger sister Sophie, the future mother of the Hanoverian dynasty in England. After regaining his territory Charles Louis paid his mother 2,000 rixdollars² a month until the recovery of his fortress Frankenthal from the Spaniards, besides allowing her gifts of corn and wine and even money. This allowance did not satisfy the extravagant Stuart daughter in her free lodgings at the Hague,³ and she repeatedly wrote to her son complaining of his neglect. In reply, he insisted that he was doing everything for her which the condition of his country would warrant. When some of the queen's creditors presented their bills to the Elector for payment, he is reported to have said that the English Parliament, and not the Elector Palatine, was responsible for the debts of the daughter of an English king.⁴ In 1660 he refused her bequest for 4,000 rixdollars on the ground that the

¹ Johann Chr. Lünig, *Europäische Staats-Consilia*, ii, 573.

² A rixdollar was worth about 35 cents.

³ "I earnestly entreat you to do so much for me as to augment that money which you give me, and then I shall make a shift to live a little something reasonable; and you did always promise me, that as your country bettered you would increase my means all you were able to give me my jointure. I do not ask you much." Letter, Elizabeth of Bohemia to the Elector Charles Louis, August 23, 1655. Sir George Bromley, *A Collection of Original Royal Letters*, p. 203.

⁴ Thurloe, *Papers*, vii, 796.

expenses of Sophie's marriage to Duke Ernest August of Hanover, and the new fortifications at Frankenthal and Heidelberg called for more money than he could get together.¹ Shortly afterwards he complained, on his part, that his mother had been speaking disrespectfully of him to various persons.² He refused to allow her to visit the Palatinate, and she died in a foreign land. By her will Rupert was made the residuary legatee of her jewels; this provision widened the breach between the two brothers, for Charles Louis insisted that his mother had had no right to dispose of her property in that way. Through the mediation of King Charles II of England a compromise was arranged in 1670 on lines which the Elector had already suggested the previous year.³ Rupert remained in England, but sent a personal representative to Heidelberg to arrange the details of the compromise.

The relations of the Palatinate with neighboring states demanded the attention of Charles Louis fully as much as did the internal affairs. Because of the absence of natural defenses, and because of the unsettled conditions during the war, encroachment had been made upon the Palatinate from all quarters. Not only had certain Palatinate rights and privileges in the neighboring states been swept away—rights which were the natural outcome of centuries of association together of contiguous states, without natural boundaries and having homogeneous populations—but worse than this, many border posts, over which the Palatines had once exercised indisputable sovereignty, were now in other hands. It is not surprising, therefore, that the militant disposition of Charles Louis to regain all that had once belonged to his house should involve him in bitter and almost interminable quarrels with his neighbors on the Rhine.

¹ Bromley, p. 299.

² Bromley, p. 223.

³ *Diarium Europaeum*, xxiii, 265.

Charles Louis was, first of all, desirous of securing the evacuation of Frankenthal by the Spaniards, for they continued to ravage the surrounding country as if no peace had been declared, and they also practiced piracy on the Rhine. Spain was still at war with France, and was loath to give up a position of such importance, while the Elector was not strong enough to use force in executing the provision of the treaty of peace. He brought the matter before the congress of German princes, which met in Nuremberg in 1649, but they only discussed the situation. He besought the Emperor to drive out the foreigners, but in vain; he appealed to the Electoral Circle of the Rhine with the same result. Rulers everywhere hesitated to use force for fear of renewing the great war. Thoroughly disgruntled, Charles Louis refused to join the league of Rhine princes, which was then forming, unless something were done at once to free Frankenthal; he even threatened to disregard the treaties of Westphalia unless Spain would also honor their provisions. His efforts to regain his own were at last rewarded; in May, 1653, the Spaniards moved out of the city which they had held for thirty years. So great was the mass of plunder which they took with them that three hundred wagons were necessary to transfer it to their boats on the Rhine.²

Shortly after the recovery of Frankenthal a territorial dispute broke out between the Elector and the Duke of Simmern.³ The Elector of Mayence was called in to settle the question, and he awarded Charles Louis a part of the Duchy of Lautern, and some other districts, December 14, 1653.

¹ "I am much confirmed thereby in my belief," he wrote to his mother on May 3, 1651, "that as long as Philipsbourg is in the French hands, or the war continue between that crown and Spain, they will not quit Franckendal." Bromley, *Letters*, p. 155.

² *Theatrum Europaeum*, vii, 159, 161.

³ *Négociations Secrètes*, iii, 620.

The next year the Bishop of Spires refused to allow Palatine subjects to pass through a village under his jurisdiction, called Deidesheim,¹ although Palatines had long enjoyed such a right. For a time it seemed that actual hostilities would follow, with the Catholics² of the Palatinate supporting the Bishop; but when the Elector himself—just to demonstrate his right to do so—forcibly opened the village gates and made his way down their principal street, the Deidesheim villagers were overawed, and the dispute was at an end.³

The Elector Palatine was on a more friendly footing with Duke Eberhard, of Wurtemberg, than with any other German prince. They were considering plans for a union of the Lutherans and Calvinists in their respective states in 1656. In 1657, Charles Louis called in Duke Eberhard to decide a dispute which had arisen between the Elector of Mayence and himself.⁴ The following year Charles Louis suggested a union of Wurtemberg, the Palatinate, Hesse-Darmstadt and the members of the Upper Circle of the Rhine.⁵ The Elector had not yet entered the League of the Rhine, because he had realized that he should be without influence in that body. If he could enter the Rheinbund with a body of allied princes, however, his prestige would be greatly increased; hence he had suggested the above union. Duke Eberhard opposed the plan on account of its cost and because he thought the union would not receive the desired recognition from the members of the Rheinbund.

¹ Charles Louis wrote to his brother Rupert at Vienna, Aug. 24, 1654: "Je pense que nous aurons ici une petite guerre avec l'Evêque de Spire, qui entr' autres torts qu'il me fait, ne veut permettre le passage à mes gens à Deidesheim, c'est à dire le golrit ou allemann, que de tout tems on a eu audit lieu tellement qu'il le faudra forcer." Bromley, p. 169.

² Thurloe, *Papers*, iv, p. 89.

³ Bromley, *Letters*, p. 171.

⁴ *Diarium Europæum*, i, 11.

⁵ Thurloe, *State Papers*, vi, 837.

Although his father had been chiefly responsible for the many misfortunes of the Palatinate family, the Emperor Ferdinand III was really kindly disposed toward Charles Louis and sought to win his friendship. In July, 1652, he granted the Elector the "Privilegium de non appellando,"¹ or supreme judicial authority within Palatinate territory. Charles Louis therefore responded to the Emperor's call for a conference of the Electors to meet in Prague in the autumn of 1652 and while there he promised to vote for the Emperor's oldest son as king of the Romans.² After the election had duly taken place in the following year, the Emperor granted the Elector the title of High Treasurer of the Empire, gave him the sum of 36,000 gulden, and freed the Palatinate from all Imperial taxes for a period of years, on condition that Charles Louis would show equal liberality toward his needy subjects.³

Of all his neighbors the Elector Palatine felt most bitter toward the Elector of Bavaria,⁴ because it was that prince who had profited by the misfortunes of the Palatines during the Thirty Years' War. It was a great disappointment to Charles Louis that the treaties of Westphalia allowed Bavaria to retain the electoral dignity and the Upper Palatinate, granted by Ferdinand II in 1623, and limited himself to the Lower Palatinate and to a new and inferior electorate. Hence he entered upon his administration with bitter feelings in his heart, and he determined to let no opportunity escape to regain what he believed to be his own. For some years the

¹ Lünig, *Teutsche Reichs-Archiv*, i, 721.

² Häusser, ii, 592-3.

³ Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv*, i, 723. This decree was published in the Palatinate on June 12, 1654.

⁴ M. Vautorte wrote to Brienne, June 12, 1653: "L'Electeur Palatin témoigne dans ses discours beaucoup de passion & de jalousie contre la maison de Bavière." *Négociations Secrètes Touchant la Paix de Munster*, iii, 553.

princes did not come into direct opposition to each other, but on the death of the Emperor Ferdinand III in 1657, trouble began at once. It had been the custom for two of the prominent German princes to serve as viceregents, called "*Reichsvikare*," during an interregnum. Before the Thirty Years' War, this honor had belonged to the Elector of Saxony in those states under Saxon law, and to the Elector Palatine in territories under Franconian law. However, as soon as the news of the Emperor's death reached Munich in April, 1657, the Elector Ferdinand Maria sent out a proclamation,¹ calling upon all loyal subjects of the Emperor to recognize in him a *Reichsvikar*, on the ground that the transfer of the electoral dignity to him from the Elector Palatine had included the powers of *Reichsvikar* as well.² At the same time Charles Louis of the Palatinate published a declaration opposing the claim of Ferdinand Maria,³ declaring that the dignity of *Reichsvikar* was something entirely separate from that of Elector; that it had been granted in earlier times to the Prince Palatine, rather than to the Elector Palatine. These proclamations and others which followed them were widely distributed throughout Western Germany, with the result that the bitter feeling between the partisans of the two princes was increased almost to the point of civil war. The Elector Palatine was defended in his contention by Brandenburg, and he had hoped for the same from France and Sweden. It was

¹ A very full account of this dispute is given in *Theatrum Europaeum*, viii, 3.

² *Diarium Europaeum*, i, 329.

³ "Krafft dessen [treaty of peace, 1648] die Pfaltz graffschaft bey Rhein/mit allen Rechten/wie solche unsere Vorfahren vor dem Krieg gehabt/Uns restituirt; Uns/als Pfaltz grafen bey Rhein/ratione Principatus seu Comitatus Palatini, die Provision, Verwaltung und Vicariat des Heil. Reichs/in den Landen des Rheins/Schwaben und Fränkischen Rechtens/" *Theat. Eur.*, *ibid.* See also *Diar. Eur.*, i, 698, 748.

just at this time, however, that these two powers were using all their influence to induce the Elector of Bavaria to become a candidate for the imperial crown, and hence they supported his claim to the Regency. Ferdinand Maria was also sustained by all the Catholic princes, although the *Reichsdeputation*¹ forbade his sending out any further proclamations. He then threatened to use force, and the report spread that he had 12,000 men in readiness to march upon the Palatinate,² and those Estates which favored the claim of the Palatine. Meanwhile he continued to exercise the rights of *Reichsvikar*, which he had assumed at the death of the Emperor.³

The hostility between Bavaria and the Palatinate was intensified by an incident⁴ which transpired in the Electoral College in May, 1658. Ferdinand Maria was not present, but was represented by a certain Dr. Oexel. At one of the sessions Dr. Oexel read a statement in which he spoke disrespectfully of Frederick V of the Palatinate, whose son was present before him at the time.⁵ Charles Louis was much affected by the reference to his father, and asked the Bavarian representative to desist; since the reading continued, he seized the nearest ink-bottle and, as he says, "shook" the ink on the Bavarian's paper in order to prevent further reading.⁶ Dr. Oexel and others claimed, however, that the bottle was thrown with intent to do injury. At any rate the reading suddenly came to an end, for Oexel and the honorable

¹ A committee of the Reichstag which administered affairs when the larger body was not in session.

² Sattler, *Gesch. Württembergs*, ix, pt. ii, pp. 189, 217.

³ At the request of the Elector of Bavaria the Emperor Leopold gave out a statement, Jan. 14, 1659, endorsing all that the former had done as *Reichsvikar* during the interregnum. Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv*, i, 726.

⁴ Sattler, *ibid.*, p. 213; *Diarium Europaeum*, i, 802.

⁵ Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv*, i, 326.

⁶ *Theatrum Europaeum*, viii, 432.

Electors who sat near him were liberally spattered with writing fluid. In the words of the contemporary chronicler: "After that there ensued a great silence, and every one left for his lodgings in order to change his damaged clothes."

This insignificant event was fraught with great danger because of the bad blood which already existed between Bavaria and the Palatinate.¹ It was entirely possible that a general conflict would ensue should hostilities once break out, for France and the Hapsburgs were allied to the Palatinate and Bavaria, respectively; while the Hapsburgs would welcome the opportunity to lend a helping hand to Spain, which was just then being hard pressed by France. After the ink-bottle episode the Bavarian representative withdrew from the sessions of the College,² and Charles Louis returned to Heidelberg the next day. The Electoral College hastened to send an explanatory note to Ferdinand Maria, lest he should at once begin hostilities on receiving the report of the happening from Dr. Oexel. The College also passed resolutions deploring the event, and charging Charles Louis with violating the rights of an envoy; the hope was expressed that he would apologize for his ill-advised conduct.

But Bavaria was not satisfied with resolutions. Ferdinand Maria wished to punish the Elector Palatine with troops for the insult which had been offered to Dr. Oexel. He therefore asked the Elector of Mayence for supplies and the right of passage to the Palatinate through that territory over which Mayence had jurisdiction as Bishop of Würzburg.³ Although John Philip of Mayence had himself been in dispute at vari-

¹ "Bey allen getreuen Patrioten nicht wenig bekummerte Vorsorg/ als ob dem Vatterland hierauss eine neue Ungelegenheit und Weitläufftigkeit/ ya wol gar ein Landverderblicher Krieg zuwachsen dörfte." *Th. Eur.*, *ibid.*

² *Theat. Europaeum*, viii, 433.

³ Sattler, *Württemberg*, ix, pt. ii, p. 217.

ous times with the Elector Palatine, he was enough of a patriotic statesman to see that such a conflict as Bavaria was planning could be of advantage only to the foreign powers who were waiting hungrily on the German borders for a chance to meddle in German affairs. He therefore replied to Ferdinand Maria that force must not be used to settle such disagreements among German princes, and announced his intention to do everything in his power to prevent a Bavarian advance. Duke Eberhard of Würtemberg also made preparations to check any Bavarian attack upon the Palatinate by way of his territories. After various Electors had written to Ferdinand Maria to dissuade him from his plan, he consented to a postponement of the matter until after the election of Emperor. Then the case was brought before the Electoral College once more.¹ After Dr. Oexel explained that he had meant no injury by his statement, and when the other Electors gave it as their opinion that no intentional slight had been put upon him, Charles Louis apologized for his conduct and expressed a desire to live at peace with Bavaria.² The Electoral College then resolved that full satisfaction had been granted on all sides, and declared the entire incident closed.

Not long after this time relations between the Palatinate and Mayence became very strained. John Philip Schönborn, Elector of Mayence, was also Bishop of Worms and Würzburg, and thus held territory on two sides of the Palatinate. He was an energetic, ambitious man, jealous of his rights, as was Charles Louis. It was but natural, therefore, that in the confused conditions of the time disagreements should arise between two such rulers. The greatest of these controversies

¹ Johann Christian Lünig, *Teutsche Reichs-Archiv*, i, 725.

² "So seye ihro leyd / was ihres Theils vorgegangen / und begehrten mit Chur-Bayern in freundvetterlicher Verständnuss zu stehen." Lünig, *ibid.*

concerned the *Wildfangsrecht*,¹ or indefeasible jurisdiction of a prince over his subjects. At one time the Palatinate Electors had had the undisputed right to follow their emigrated subjects into certain cities in the neighboring states in order to collect from them the customary tax, or *Leibzins*, which was due from all Palatinate subjects. The practice had then fallen into disuse, and had been forgotten by even the learned; ² but when Charles Louis was restored to the Palatinate by the peace treaties of 1648, and began to revive the regime which had existed before the Thirty Years' War, he turned back to the *Wildfangsrecht*, for most of his Palatine population had been driven from home by the terrible devastation of the war, and the scanty remnant was in no condition to support the government.³ On July 5, 1653, he made a treaty ⁴ with the Elector of Mayence in which each prince recognized the right of the other to send out officers to collect personal⁵ taxes from those subjects who had emigrated; even the children of such persons were to be regarded as subjects of the same prince as their parents, and not of him in whose territories they were born. In succeeding years, Charles Louis carried out this policy to such an extent that great hostility was aroused in the neighboring states.⁶ It was said that he would accept no arbitration in the case of persons whose allegiance was in doubt; that he not only declared them to be Palatinate subjects and collected taxes from them, but also claimed the right to send Reformed ministers

¹ Jus wildfangiatius. ("das Recht entlaufene Hörige zurückzubehalten und zu eigenen Hörigen zu machen"). *Diarium Europaeum*, volume xii, is almost entirely made up of the arguments in this case.

² Sattler, *Württemberg*, x, pt. xii, p. 88.

³ Häusser, ii, 657.

⁴ *Diarium Europaeum*, xii, Append., p. 75.

⁵ A *Leibzins* called the "*Beeth*."

⁶ *Diarium Europaeum*, xii, Append., p. 16; xiii, 34.

to them in order to keep them in touch with the Palatinate Church.¹ It was charged that out of 4014 inhabitants in certain hamlets of the bishopric of Worms and Spires, the Elector Charles Louis had claimed 3515 as owing allegiance to himself.²

Affairs finally came to such a pass that the Elector of Mayence,³ supported by a number of Rhine princes, complained to Emperor Leopold, and then sent a formal protest to the Elector Palatine, asking him to restore the subjects whom he had seized, or force would be used against him.⁴ Leopold⁵ then wrote to Charles Louis to induce him to give up his extreme claims, saying that intervention would otherwise be necessary. Charles Louis answered the princes that he would attempt to meet force with force, but he asked for patience on their part until a peaceable settlement could be made.⁶ To the Emperor he replied that he courted an Imperial investigation, if all rights of his family would be respected. On the receipt of this letter in Vienna, representatives of the Emperor set out at once for Friedrichsburg where the Palatinate court was then located. The allies had meanwhile sent out a proclamation forbidding Palatinate officers to exercise the disputed rights within their respective territories; the Elector of Mayence, as leader of the opposition to the Palatine, had taken possession of the city of Ladenburg, a short distance below Heidelberg on the Neckar.⁷ This city had been under the joint administra-

¹ *Diarium Europaeum*, xi, 615.

² *Diar. Europaeum*, xii, Append., p. 217.

³ Supporting Mayence were Cologne, Treves, Spires, Strasburg, the Duke of Lorraine and the Imperial Knights of Suabia, Franconia and the Rhine.

⁴ Sattler, *Württemberg*, x, pt. xii, p. 88.

⁵ *Diar. Eur.*, xii, Append., p. 56.

⁶ *Diar. Eur.*, *ibid.*, p. 58.

⁷ *Diarium Europaeum*, xii, 522.

tion of the Elector Palatine and the Bishop of Worms,¹ so that its capture was a decided infringement upon Palatinate rights, while its nearness to Heidelberg made its possession by a hostile force a menace to the Palatine's chief city. Hence, when the Emperor's representatives arrived at Friedrichsburg, Charles Louis demanded as a preliminary² to negotiations, that the Elector of Mayence should restore all captured territory. This condition was not acceded to by Mayence, and during the summer of 1665 both princes were occupied in securing allies and in raising troops. The Elector Palatine received the promise of support from the dukes of Brunswick,³ through the influence of his sister Sophie, and it was reported that the King of France stood ready to help him in case of the actual outbreak of hostilities.⁴

At the prospect of open war, with the possibility of a greater conflict in the background, vigorous efforts were made by outside parties to find a compromise between Mayence and the Palatine. Early in the dispute Duke Eberhard, of Würtemberg, wrote⁵ to both Electors, urging moderation and offering his mediation, for should war actually come, his own territory would probably suffer as much as the Palatinate. The King of Sweden⁶ wrote to both princes in July, 1665, asking them to avoid war, but declaring his intention of supporting the Elector Palatine in case of a conflict. This was followed by a petition to the Emperor from the Evangelical delegates in the *Reichstag*, protesting against the seizure of

¹ Since 1387. See *Diar. Europ.*, xii, App., 218.

² *Diarium Europaeum*, xiii, 125.

³ *Publikationen aus den K. Preuss. Staats-archiven*, xxvi, 89-90.

⁴ *Diar. Europ.*, xiii, 85.

⁵ This letter is No. 24 in the Appendix of Volume X of Sattler's *History of Würtemberg*.

⁶ *Diarium Europaeum*, xii, Append., 149, 154. A letter from the Elector of Mayence to the King of Sweden of Aug. 20, 1665, gives a very complete statement of the case against the Palatinate.

Ladenburg by Mayence and the subsequent exactions which had been made upon the surrounding country, and praying Leopold to use the Imperial influence to restore the conditions which had existed before Mayence had resorted to force.¹ The Elector of Brandenburg counselled moderation, and his influence added to that of the Emperor's personal representative in the West, Count von Königseck, succeeded in persuading Charles Louis to give up his plan of retaking Ladenburg by force, and to agree to a sequestration of the post.² To this plan Mayence also gave assent, and in September, 1665, Ladenburg was turned over to the Margrave William of Baden to be kept until the ownership could be ascertained by a court of arbitrators.

The sequestration of Ladenburg³ did not dispose of the broader question at issue between the Palatinate and the allies—that of the *Wildfangsrecht*. Hence the hostile agitation continued and opposing proclamations were sent out until the Truce of Oppenheim⁴ finally opened the way for mediation in November, 1665. According to this compact, the allies were to evacuate the Palatinate places which they had taken, and both sides agreed to a suspension of claims, until the disputed questions, concerning customs duties, the right of way in certain places and the *Wildfangsrecht*, had been considered by mediators.⁵ This truce was extended in May, 1666, and delegates from France and Sweden were called to Heilbronn to mediate.⁶ All parties honored the truce, with the exception of the Duke of Lorraine, whose troops shamelessly ravaged the Palatinate in the worst spirit of the Thirty Years' War.⁷ They robbed whole villages; they drove away cattle;

¹ *Diarium Europaeum*, xii, Append., p. 138.

² Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv*, i, 405; *Diarium Europaeum*, xiii, 156.

³ *Diar. Europ.*, xiii, 217; also Append., 314-16.

⁴ Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv*, i, 406. ⁵ *Diarium Europaeum*, xv, 313.

⁶ Lünig, *Europäische Staats-Consilia*, ii, 747.

⁷ *Diarium Europaeum*, xvi, 17, 109.

what they could not carry with them they destroyed. They disregarded both the appeals of the Elector Charles Louis¹ and the direct command of the Emperor that the truce be respected, and they were checked in their lawlessness only by the ultimate decision of the mediators. This decision was made public in February, 1667:² besides restoring to the Palatinate all places which the allies had occupied in the course of the controversy, it supported the Elector's principal contention with regard to the *Wildfangsrecht*.

Even this decision did not bring peace to the Palatinate, for Mayence opposed the execution of its provisions wherever possible,³ and the Lorrainers continued in possession of certain Palatinate posts which they had held ever since the close of the great war in 1648.⁴ Charles Louis sought to expel them by force⁵ from these positions in September, 1668, and a battle was fought near Bingen. Although both sides claimed the victory, the result was so little in the Elector's favor that the intervention of France was necessary to prevent the Duke of Lorraine from invading the Palatinate. Charles Louis then obeyed the Emperor's command to disarm. Following this incident the Palatinate had a short interval of comparative quiet, but the complex question of border rights would not long remain in the background. Even with the French war-cloud lowering darker and darker upon the horizon from 1670 on, Mayence and the Palatine were at each other's throats concerning obscure rights which it was almost impossible to define.⁶

¹ *Diar. Europ.*, xvi, p. 224.

² Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv.*, ii, 424.

³ *Diarium Europaeum*, xvii, 200.

⁴ Homburg and Landstuhl, *Diar. Europ.*, xxi, 58.

⁵ "damit die umher ligende Lande und Einwohner dermaleins von den verdriesslichen Beschwerden und unaufhörlichen Plackereyen mochten befreyet werden." *Diar. Europ.*, xx, 7.

⁶ Some Mayence officers and soldiers forced a passage through the Palatinate hamlet of Sachsenflur in April, 1672. *Diar. Europ.*, xxv, 707.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY ACTS OF LOUIS XIV AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON GERMANY

RARELY can the history of any European country be studied intelligently apart from that of its neighbors. This fact is especially true of German conditions during the reign of Louis XIV; but even the Franco-German relations cannot be understood when considered separately from the general current of European politics. The attitude of France toward Germany during this period was always influenced by the great question which dominated French policies for over half a century—the question of Spanish territories and the Spanish succession. We have seen that one of the strongest motives which caused Cardinal Mazarin to work for the conclusion of the League of the Rhine in 1658, was the desire to shut off from the Spanish Netherlands the German aid which had enabled Spain to hold out so long against her stronger opponent. Likewise, when the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 had given France all that had been sought in the war, when Spain had been relegated to the position of a second-rate power, the attention of the French statesmen who succeeded Mazarin, was still directed toward Spain, for the extinction of the Spanish royal line was imminent, and French interests were opposed to any considerable extension of Hapsburg power as a result of that event.¹ This concern on the part of the French leaders must ever be borne in mind

¹ "On peut dire que la succession d'Espagne fut le pivot sur lequel tourna presque tout le règne de Louis XIV." M. Mignet, *Négociations Relatives à la Succession d'Espagne*. Intrdc.

when studying their dealings with German states after 1660, and especially with those states upon the Rhine.

It was a time when a united Germany was out of the question, and no one even thought of such a thing. The French saw no German nation upon the northeastern borders, but rather the wrecks of Spanish provinces, poorly governed, territorially separate from the mother country, bound to it or together by no ties of population or language, ready to be taken up by any strong power which was able to give them a stable government. And beyond these Spanish provinces the French saw only warring and practically independent states, whose princes were so jealous of each other that common action was next to impossible; of these the Elector Palatine was a typical example. The Congress of Westphalia, which had restored him to an ancestral territory, had also taken away the last hope of common action among the German States as a part of an organic whole, by granting the German princes independence in their foreign affairs. Furthermore, to France the Emperor was no more a German Emperor than the congeries of German States formed a German nation. To France the Hapsburg Emperor was the head of a rival house, a prince devoted primarily to dynastic interests, a ruler who was scarcely less foreign to German life than the King of France himself. A long experience had exposed not only to France, but to all Europe—a land-hunger on the part of the Hapsburgs second to none on the continent, and the ideal known to be held by each successive Hapsburg Emperor was the restoration of the empire of Charles V.¹

At this period France was in a peculiarly advantageous position to profit from the exhausted condition of Spain. In contrast to the disunited and inharmonious relations among

¹ A. Legrelle, *La Diplomatie Française et la Succession d'Espagne*, i, 151.

the German states, the government of France was in a wonderfully centralized and effective state when the young Louis XIV assumed control at the death of Mazarin in 1661. The land was prosperous and wealthy; the people were full of enthusiasm for France and their king. The city of Paris, from its wealth, display, its beautiful parks and public buildings, and finally from a strong intellectual and literary renaissance, was coming to be in many ways the capital of Europe instead of merely the chief city of France. In no country was this influence more widely felt than in Germany during the decade immediately following the conclusion of the League of the Rhine. Many of the German princes remembered with gratitude that it had been the French soldiers who had rescued the Protestant states from the Imperial armies in the course of the Thirty Years' War. The wider French designs upon Spain, and the ambitious plans for the extension of the northeastern frontier had not yet been evolved in Paris, and France was regarded as a friend by many of the German princes. On the other hand, while French influence was thus increasing in the territory nominally under Hapsburg control, the vacillating and uncertain policy of the Emperor Leopold¹ and his unpatriotic attitude toward Germany caused a great decrease of confidence in him as a leader. Hence, Louis XIV came, in time, to be fully as much Emperor of West Germany as Leopold himself.²

¹ Legrelle, i, 151. See also G. E. Guhrauer, *Kur-Mainz in der Epoche von 1672*, p. 311.

² On January 19, 1673, the authorities of the city of Strasburg, in writing to Louis for permission to build a bridge across the Rhine, adopted the following tone: "Eu. Majest. unterthänigst bitten / gleichfalls Anordnung zu thun / dass die Schadloss Haltung / so Sie in Ihrem Schreiben vom 27 Novembris versprochen / geschehen möge—sind wir Deroselben gefällige Dienste zu erweisen so aufrichtig geneiget." *Theatrum Europaeum*, xi, 288. In reply Louis ordered the bridge broken down when it had finally been built without his consent. *Diarium Europaeum*, xxvii, Append.

The extent of the French sway over the German mind of those days seems almost incredible in this age of independent thinking and acting. No young man's education was regarded as complete,¹ without a year or two at Paris, the center of wealth and fashion. These returning travellers carried French fashion and French articles of dress into remote districts of the Fatherland;² and with the spread of French ideas, German dress, German manners and customs, and even the German language came to be looked upon as vulgar. Those who could afford it received a thorough instruction in French, and the use of French quotations, of French words and phrases became very popular and was a mark of peculiar distinction. Up to the signing of the treaties of Westphalia, all great public documents had been written in Latin, but after that time French became the language of diplomacy, and it has continued so almost to the present day. The German language was much influenced by the French bondage, and still contains many French words, whose admission to the German vocabulary dates from this period. In other educational lines also, the Germans were not ashamed to follow French leadership. The philosopher, Hermann Conring, was long a pensioner of Louis XIV, and Leibnitz, at the court of the Elector of Mayence, came very fully under French influence.³

Nowhere was the German servitude to French models more clearly marked than in court life and in the administration of the state. Each little German princelet set out to imitate the establishment which was maintained by the Grand Monarch

¹ Martin Philippon, *Louis XIV*, p. 207.

² A German writer suggested in 1672 that the best means of freeing Germany from French influence would be the abolition of French styles in dress, the discontinuance of travel in France, and the exclusion of French products. *Aurifodina Gallica; Diar. Europ.*, xxv, Append.

³ Philippon, p. 209.

in Paris and Versailles.¹ Parks were laid out in imitation of the great park of Versailles; no prince felt that he was measuring up to the highest standard of princely life without undertaking extensive building projects and maintaining a gay and extravagant court, with a rigid and stilted etiquette modeled upon that in vogue in Paris.² A standing army must be kept up; ballets and comedies must be presented—and the money for all this display was obtained through a heartless exploitation of the subjects by means of a centralized bureaucracy, in imitation of the centralization of power in France. Now, France was a great and wealthy country, and profited for a time by the concentration of authority because of the improved administration which resulted; but when the same system was extended to German states it resulted only in disaster, for incapable or reactionary princes reproduced only the despotism with few of its redeeming features.

The conclusion of the League of the Rhine under the French protectorate in 1658 and the signature of the treaty of the Pyrenees a year later, were the preliminaries to this great spread of French influence. Mazarin might well have rested content with these brilliant successes, but he went further, and in the very evening of his life carried out a project, the importance of which was not then apparent, but which was at a later day to play a very great part in French affairs. In the summer of 1660, the young King Louis was married to the Infanta Maria Theresa of Spain, the oldest daughter of

¹ "Kebswelber zu Dutzenden halten Schlösser bauen, Komödien aufführen lassen, die Unterthanen aussaugen, das Geld vergeuden, das meinten sie liesse sich am Neckar und an der Elbe eben so gut thun, als in Paris oder Versailles." Fr. Rühs, *Ernfluss Frankreichs auf Deutschland*, p. 168.

² Flattery of the prince was one of the principal occupations of these courtiers. "Wann Gott nicht Gott wäre, wer sollte billiger Gott sein als Eu. hochfürstliche Durchlaucht?" said one of those parasites to the insignificant Landgrave of Hesse. Quoted by Philippon, p. 211.

the first marriage of Philip IV. According to the contract signed at the time the Infanta renounced all claim to the Spanish succession,¹ and Louis was to receive a large dowry with his queen. The treasury of Spain was empty, however, and as time went on the dowry was not paid. Hence as early as 1662, negotiations were begun by France to annul the renunciation which Maria Theresa had made concerning Spanish territory. Although Mazarin was then no longer at hand to shape French policy, and Philip IV still lived, it is evident that Louis was already considering the possibility of pushing the Queen's claim to at least a part of the Spanish inheritance. His plan became clearer when, in 1663 he proposed to the states of Holland to divide the Spanish Netherlands. The latter became alarmed at the suggestion, and appealed to the German Diet for help, as the Circle of Burgundy. The call met with slight reponse, however, for French agents and French gold were everywhere at work among the German princes to secure neutrality, if not active support, when the time should come to press the claim of the Queen of France to Spanish territory.²

In 1663 the League of the Rhine was renewed for the second time for a period of three years; in the same year was solemnized the marriage between the Emperor Leopold and the Infanta Margaret Theresa, younger sister of the Queen of France. As a consequence it was obvious that to the Emperor's natural and inherited opposition to France would be added a special devotion to the Spanish cause; but this did not prevent the French king from sending a strong corps of troops to aid the Emperor in checking the Turks at the great

¹ Henri Vast, *Les grands Traités de Louis XIV.* (In *Collection de Textes pour servir à l'étude et à l'enseignement de l'histoire*, xxxi, 1.)

² Henri Lonchay, *La Rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays Bas*, p. 218. (Lonchay has drawn his information from the archives of the Spanish State Department.)

battle of St. Gotthard in 1664. These French soldiers marched through German territory, and fought side by side with German soldiers under the Imperial commander. Their apparently disinterested appearance in this time of need very considerably increased German confidence in France. In the same year the Elector of Mayence called in French troops to reduce the city of Erfurt to submission, and in 1665, as we have seen, French and Swedish delegates were chosen to mediate between the Elector Palatine and other princes on the question of the *Wildfangsrecht*.

At this most opportune time, when French influence was at its height, King Philip IV of Spain died, September, 1665. Since he was succeeded by the frail and almost imbecile Charles II, whose death was expected at any time, Louis XIV determined to brave the combined opposition of the Emperor and Spain, and at once assert his claim to the inheritance of Maria Theresa. Although he did not succeed in getting a renewal of the League of the Rhine in 1666, he very soon concluded separate treaties with Bavaria, Mayence and other Rhine States, which bound those states to neutrality and a refusal to grant a passage through their territories to troops of the Emperor. Then, having incited the Hungarians to revolt, and having intrigued at Constantinople against the Emperor in order to keep the latter occupied on his eastern boundaries, Louis XIV advanced his claim to the whole of the Spanish Netherlands, basing his case on the obscure Right of Devolution,¹ known in some districts of the Netherlands.

There was no declaration of war; Louis XIV merely set out in May, 1667—as he was careful to explain to Europe—on a journey to take possession of his wife's inheritance. He was

¹ By this law daughters of a first marriage take precedence over the sons of a second marriage. It was recognized in but few of the provinces of the Netherlands, and applied only to private property.

accompanied on the "journey" by a strong division of the French army, which was becoming one of the best in Europe, under the careful management of Louvois, Minister of War. The Spanish governor of the Netherlands, Castel Rodrigo, appealed to the German princes for help on the ground that the Spanish Netherlands were a part of the Empire ;' but M. Gravel the French representative at Ratisbon went before the Diet with a vigorous and effective protest against such action, on the ground that it would be contrary to the treaties of Westphalia.

Meanwhile the French advance had been very rapid, and the greater portion of the Spanish Netherlands was soon in their hands. The suddenness of the success was a disadvantage to France however, for each new victory but served to increase the alarm and distrust which was beginning to be felt on every side. Brandenburg, Cologne, Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel concluded a treaty of alliance for common defence, on August 22.² Influenced by the same distrust, the Elector of Mayence shortly afterward formed a defensive alliance³ with the Duke of Lorraine and the Elector of Treves. The Emperor Leopold was also on the point of sending troops against France but the French envoy to Vienna, M. Gremontville, succeeded in inducing him to recall the order. The French representatives then went one step further and negotiated a secret treaty of partition with Leopold by which France was to receive the Spanish Netherlands, Naples and Sicily on the death of Charles II, and the Emperor was to have Spain, the West Indies and Milan. These negotiations were followed very closely by the conclusion of the Triple Alliance which checked the French advance. Through the influence of Sir William Temple, English ambassador at the Hague,

¹ Vast, *Grands Traités*. (Collection de Textes, xxiii, 7.)

² Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv*, i, contin., pt. ii, p. 343.

³ See Leibnitz, *De foedere Rhenano*.

and John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, the powers of Sweden, England and Holland bound themselves to use force, if necessary, to put an end to French aggressions. This alliance proved effective and Louis XIV was compelled to be satisfied with only a portion of his conquests in the treaty of Aix la Chapelle in May, 1668.

From our point of view the most interesting feature connected with the war of Devolution was the effect which it had upon German public opinion. Up to that time France had been regarded with great favor in Germany, especially since the assumption of chief authority by Louis XIV: the plans of the young king had not yet been disclosed; some had even thought¹ that he could be induced to turn the great wealth and military strength of his kingdom to the emancipation of Europe from the Turk. By the enunciation of the principle of Devolution the curtain was drawn aside and Germans began to see what the future might have in store for them, from the direction of France. The period from 1667 to 1674 marks a complete revolution in German public opinion.² The danger which was at first detected only by the few far-seeing ones, was held up to public view during this time in violent prose or doggerel rime, and spread broadcast over the land in various kinds of hand bills and pamphlets known as Flugschriften and Flugblätter. The repeated warnings found such a lodgment in the public mind that those princes which had remained neutral, or had openly favored the French in 1667 were eager to join in the war against France, which was declared in 1674. A great deal of the

¹ This fantastic plan was entertained by able, sober-minded men even as late as 1672. In that year Leibnitz and Boineburg, first minister of the Elector of Mayence, visited Paris in an attempt to turn French arms from Holland to the Turk. Leibnitz wrote "De expeditione Aegyptiaca regi Franciae proponenda Leibnitii iusta dissertatio."

² Johannes Haller, *Die Deutsche Publizistik in den Jahren 1668-74*, pp. 90—.

credit for this change of opinion is due to the persistent pamphleteers of the period.¹

One of the earliest of these papers, of unknown origin, tells of the so-called "Colloquy" between a Hollander and a Frenchman, in which the former called attention to the general fear which was felt by the neighbors of France, and to the belief that King Louis was bribing the Turks to attack the Empire that he might have a free hand in Netherlands. To this the Frenchman replied that his people felt nothing but a sincere affection for their northern neighbors, but the Hollander went on to say that he could not trust the French assertions of friendship, but would prepare for self-defense and would defend even the weakest of his neighbors lest the destruction of such states by France pave the way for the ruin of the Dutch in turn. In the same year, 1667, a pamphlet appeared from French sources, but as it boldly supported the policy of a Greater France, it served to increase rather than to allay suspicion. This writer, a certain M. Aubery, claimed that it was ridiculous to speak of a Holy Roman Empire in Germany any longer; he recalled to mind that Henry the Fowler had been a vassal of the French crown, and that Saxony, Thuringia, Bavaria and other provinces had once belonged to the French monarchy.

The growth of anti-French feeling in Germany was accelerated by the great energy and ability of one man—Baron Lisola,² counsellor of the Emperor, diplomatist, and pamphle-

¹ Hans von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, *Die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland im Zeitalter Ludwigs, xiv*, p. 18.

² François Paul, baron de Lisola, was born at Salins in Franche Comté in 1613. In 1638 he entered the service of the Emperor and was rapidly promoted. He was sent in turn on diplomatic missions to England, Poland, Spain, and Holland. His aim was to form a great coalition against France which should aid in the restoration of the Empire of Charles V. He was very influential in bringing about the alliance of Spain, the States of Holland and the Emperor in 1693.

teer. He was an ardent supporter of the House of Hapsburg, and was keenly alive to the French designs upon Germany. He therefore published a series of bitter attacks upon France, coupled with stirring appeals to German patriotism. The first of these pamphlets, *Bouclier d'État*,¹ appeared in 1667, just as Louis XIV was preparing to invade the Netherlands, and while he was still enjoying a large degree of confidence in Germany. After calling attention to the great wealth of France—accruing largely from commerce with surrounding nations²—and emphasizing the advantage arising from a unified form of administration, Lisola outlines the principles upon which the French government is conducted. According to him, French statesmen seek to keep up foreign war; they interfere as often as possible in the affairs of other States, and spread French influence through arbitration and mediation. Finally, they place loyalty to the interests of France above sacred treaties, blood ties or religion. “They have a nation which is unified,” wrote he. “Let us combine our forces; they profit from our troubles; let us seek safety by humbling their pride—let us meet force with force. They lead us on by vain hopes of peace, let us put ourselves in a position to force them to wish peace seriously.”³

Direct as was this appeal, the German princes did not yet sufficiently appreciate the danger in the French policy to unite in a common action against France. Hence, when Louis XIV set out after the Devolution War to clear away by diplomacy the obstacles which had kept him back from complete

¹ “Defender of the State.” Quoted in Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, i, 22. This pamphlet also appears in *Diar. Europæum*, xv.

² “La France est un royaume qui a toutes ses parties unies, abondante en hommes, industrielle en commerce, qui attire avec ses bagatelles et ses modes l’argent de toutes les autres nations.” Rousset, *ibid.*

³ Rousset, *ibid.*

success in 1668, he met with little opposition in Germany. There is an old French proverb which says that the man who has three enemies "should make peace with one, a truce with the second and should declare war on the third."¹ This was exactly the policy which the French king adopted after 1668. By the secret treaty of Dover Charles II of England became completely subservient to French interests with regard to Holland and the Netherlands; shortly afterward the neutrality of Sweden was won by the promise of a heavy subsidy from France; and for Holland, the cornerstone of the Triple Alliance, Louis was planning war. To his own personal displeasure at being checked in 1668, was added a widespread popular jealousy of the Dutch, which was caused by the rapid commercial rise of Holland.² Louis was determined that Holland should never again be in a position to rob him of the fruits of victory, and in this design he was supported by the nation. As he himself later said, he regarded the treaty of Aix la Chapelle as merely a truce, to which he had consented until he could resume the war with better prospects of success.³

In order to create these favorable conditions it was necessary, in addition to destroying the Triple Alliance, to make sure of the support or at least the neutrality of the leading princes of West Germany. Accordingly, a treaty was secured with Cologne⁴ early in 1669, which bound the Elector to do all in his power to establish a league of princes favorable to France. M.

¹ "Celuy, qui a trois ennemis doit faire la paix avec l'un, une trefue avec l'autre & porter la guerre au troisieme." Lettre, Sincerus Germanus Escrite à Louis Seldenus, in *Diarium Europaeum*, xxvi, 40.

² French wines were shut out of Holland in 1671. The Dutch then secured a discount on the Rhein tolls levied on German wines. G. B. Depping, *Correspondance Administrative sous le Règne de Louis XIV*, iii, 470.

³ Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, i, 322.

⁴ Lünig, *Reichs-Archiv*, i, contin., pt. iii, p. 109.

Gravel,¹ who was still the French representative at Ratisbon, was so successful in winning the confidence of the Diet for France, that he was admitted to the Order of St. Michael, the honor being conferred by the Duke of Mecklenburg in the presence of the entire Diet.² Shortly afterwards Gravel published a pamphlet advocating the candidacy of Louis XIV as German Emperor, to which honor the territories received under the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle gave him a certain eligibility. At the same time Bavaria was separated from her long attachment to the Hapsburgs, and the Elector signed a treaty of alliance with France; by a secret article³ of this treaty he promised to support Louis XIV as the next Emperor. While Louis XIV probably did not look upon his election as a possibility, the fact that his candidacy was even considered will show that his influence had not yet been destroyed.

Meanwhile preparations for war had gone steadily forward in France month by month.⁴ The constant levying and drilling of troops left no doubt in the public mind—not only in France, but in all Europe—that some great movement was being planned. The French minister of war, M. Louvois, had carried through such sweeping reforms in the French

¹ "Die Jahre stärkster französischer Einwirkungen, Gravel in Regensburg hatte überall seine Hand im Spiele. Ludwig XIV selbst soll damals nach der römischen Krone gegriffen, Gravel in einer gedruckten Schrift offen zu seiner Wahl aufgefordert haben." Haller, p. 18.

² Sattler, *Gesch. Württemberg*, x, pt. xii, p. 180.

³ "Mais l'Empire devenant vacant par la mort de l'Empereur, chacun des contractants s'efforcera de disposer le collège électoral à nommer empereur Sa Majesté très chrétienne, et Sa Serénité Electorale, roi des Romains." *Recueil des Instructions Diplomatiques données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France*, vii, 33, 34.

⁴ "Frankreich machte sich wegen der starcken Kriegs-Rüstung/ und/ wie die gemeine Sage/ bevorstehenden Reyse in Flandern/ bei jederman redoutabel." Entry of March, 1670. *Diarium Europaeum*, xxii, 308. See also *Diar. Europ.*, xxv, 509, 564, 648.

army, that it had become by far the best in Europe.¹ It had taken on the character of the modern scientific fighting machine, and was no longer made up of irregular masses of almost lawless men as had been the rule in the Thirty Years' War. So efficient was this powerful weapon which Louis XIV found ready to hand, that he was able to take immediate and effective action, when he learned in August, 1670, that the Duke of Lorraine was raising troops to aid Holland. He occupied the Duke's territories so suddenly, and in such force, that resistance was out of the question. For the time being Germany—and especially the Rheinland—was terror stricken,² and Louis seemed to have lost whatever confidence he might have regained since the War of Devolution. Although he hastened to explain to both the Emperor and the Empire, that his action was purely a defensive measure, he was not believed. The city of Strasburg began to throw up additional fortifications, the peasants of Alsace³ awaited momentarily the appearance of the dreaded French troops. Brandenburg started to fortify the border posts, Cologne undertook additional fortifications, while Münster called all male citizens over 14 years of age to arms.

The seizure of Lorraine also stimulated the anti-French pamphleteers of Germany. Out from the immediate circle of Lisola, if not written directly by him, went the pamphlet called "*Veridicus Gallicus*," a strong indictment of German indifference to the general welfare, and a ringing appeal to all Germans to unite against the invader. Says this writer,

¹ For an account of Louvois' great work in the French army see Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, i, 176.

² Entry in *Diarium Europaeum*, xxvii, of Aug. 7, 1670.

³ "Die Bauren im Ober-Elsasz wachten alle bey nächtlicher Zeit / so schantzten auch die Strassburger mit grossem Volck und zogen die Burger nebenst den Soldaten auff / wie dann auch alle Stück auffgeführt wurden." *Diar. Eur.*, xxiii, 90.

"Arise, dead men, come to judgment; the French have sounded the last trump! The French have set a limit to the freedom of all Europe. The princes have eyes, but they see not; some are blinded by glittering gold; others are affected by the French as by the Gorgon, and they become as dumb as if turned to stone! Gott! How times have changed! What has become of the might of the Netherlands, of German fidelity, and the unity of the Empire? Louis XIV is another Soliman; at the same time that he speaks words of peace, he is really beginning the war. What he cannot accomplish through deceit, he attains by bribes. Meanwhile, what are you princes of the Empire doing? You are allowing your hereditary enemy to bind your hands; you are hoodwinked by Gravel, Gremonville and other agents—wolves in sheep's clothing. Awake! Awake! Brush the sleep from your eyes! Take counsel speedily, seize your arms like men!"¹

About the same time appeared the "*Französische Wahrsager*," or "The French Soothsayer." This was also a burning appeal for combined action against France; the anonymous author pointed out that no opposition to the French occupation of Lorraine could be expected from the Palatinate or Mayence, for those states had too recently had trouble with the Duke of Lorraine themselves. He continued: "Beware lest the King of France take possession of the Rhine,² not only without a blow, but even with your own help! Oh, how dead and cold you all are; what a mortal disease has fastened upon the Empire! . . . Remember,

¹ "Stehet auf, ihr Toten, kommt zum Gericht! Der Franzos lasst die Totenposaune blasen; der Freiheit letzten Tag lasst der Frantzos—dem ganzen Europa ansagen." Haller, p. 94.

² "Nimm wahr, dass der König aus Franckreich den Rheinstrom ohne Schwert, ja mit Eurer selbst eigenen Hilfe bald unter sein Gebiet bringen wird." Südenhorst, *Öff. Meinung*, p. 22.

O Germans, what Livy has said: that the French (sic) attack at first with almost superhuman strength, but at the last they are weaker than women."

It was the great concern of the French government to counteract the hostile spirit shown in these writings, and to reassure the German princes. A reply to the Soothsayer appeared in Leyden, written under French influence. The author declared that the empire was in no danger whatever from France; he sought to show that there was no harm in German princes being French pensioners, for they could turn against France as soon as German interests demanded it. More effective than pamphlets, however, was the use which Louis XIV made of his diplomatic agents. France was represented abroad at this time by a very efficient set of envoys,¹ who were able, by a highly developed system of communication with Paris and an accurate knowledge of men, to render signal services to their home government. In the present instances they were aided by the universal dislike of the Duke of Lorraine in Germany. Although the occupation of Lorraine really threatened a loss of Imperial territory, the German princes looked upon it with less disfavor than they might otherwise have done, had it not been for the irresponsible and thievish career which the duke had followed since the peace of Westphalia. Full advantage was taken of this situation by the French agents, and as time passed, suspicions were allayed, and the sounds of preparation for war grew fainter and fainter. The work slackened on the great fortifications which had been begun at Cologne—some said, as the French gold found its way into the pockets of the municipal

¹ Money was lavishly used. In July, 1673, Gravel reported to Colbert that he held the receipt of the Elector of Mayence for 70,000 crowns; and added, "que je n'ay osé hazarder à la poste, parce que cela feroit un grand fracas si le paquet où il seroit venoit à estre pris." Depping, *Correspondance*, iii, 235.

authorities.¹ Even the Emperor was won for France; by using the argument that the proposed attack upon Holland was to be largely directed against the Protestant religion, the French envoy at Vienna induced Leopold to sign a treaty in November, 1671,² in which the Emperor promised to remain neutral during a war between France and any one of the three powers—Holland, England or Sweden.³

The negotiations went even further than neutrality in the case of the Elector Palatine, and ended in a family alliance with the French king. Charles Louis had not joined the Rheinbund in 1658, and he had greatly distrusted France in the years that followed, but he had finally been drawn nearer to France by the favorable decision of the *Wildfang* dispute in 1665, and by the intercession of Louis XIV in his favor after the battle with the Duke of Lorraine in 1668. Tired of the constant bickerings with his neighbors, concerned over the open and defenseless character of his territories, desirous of regaining his lost districts and of adding to them if possible, the Elector had come to feel the need of an alliance with a stronger power. He could hope for little from the Emperor, for Leopold had always supported Bavaria against him. Since he cared little for the ideal of a united Germany, he viewed with slight concern the French advance toward the Rhine, except in so far as it endangered his own status. He was even willing to acknowledge allegiance to the King of France, in case that action would increase his territories or give him a position of greater security.⁴ Although Louis XIV had no feelings of friendship for the Elector Palatine, and placed no trust in him or his promises, he wished to make use of him for the time being, inasmuch as the Palatin-

¹ *Diarium Europaeum*, xxv, 669.

² *Diarium Europaeum*, xxvii, 129.

³ Haller, 109.

⁴ Häusser, ii, 625.

ate would occupy a strategic position on the Rhine in case of a war with the empire. He knew of the ambitions of Charles Louis, and therefore allowed him to hope that he might one day become king over a large territory,¹ in a larger empire which France would establish by extension into neighboring States.

When, therefore, the Electress Palatine,² a sister-in-law of Charles Louis then living in Paris, suggested the marriage of the daughter of the Elector to the brother of the King, the proposition was favorably received in both Paris and Heidelberg. Charles Louis had had two children by his marriage with Charlotte of Hesse-Cassel; Carl, who succeeded his father in the Electorate in 1680, and Elizabeth Charlotte, called Liselotte. The rather insignificant brother of Louis XIV, known always as Monsieur, had been first married to Henrietta Anna, sister of Charles II of England. Monsieur's second marriage, like the first, was arranged for state reasons and at the command of the King. Monsieur could not but look down upon a German princess, and neither Charles Louis nor his daughter were admirers of the French. Elizabeth Charlotte spoke of herself as a "political lamb, slaughtered for the state."³

The marriage contract was signed at Strasburg whither Elizabeth Charlotte had been accompanied by her father; the Duke of Orleans was represented by the Marquis de Béthune. The princess renounced all her rights to the Palatinate succession and to Palatinate territory; she was nomi-

¹ This kingdom was to be called Austrasia. Charles Louis corresponded with Louis concerning it, and struck a coin hinting at such an arrangement. Häusser, ii, 627.

² For the original account of this marriage see *Diarium Europaeum*, xxv, pp. 3—. Ludwig Häusser, *Rheinpfalz*, ii, 715.

³ "Das politische Lamm, das dem Staate geopfert ward." Quoted Häusser, ii, 625.

nally allowed to retain her religion, if she so desired.¹ On November 11, 1671, the party set out for the French boundary, leaving the Elector behind. At Metz they were met by a large company and the Duke of Plessis who represented Monsieur. At that place Elizabeth Charlotte solemnly renounced the Protestant religion, on November 15, and was received into the Catholic Church by the bishop of Metz. Charles Louis pretended to be greatly surprised when he received news of this action, but by such an attitude he merely wished to disarm the criticism of the Protestant princes.² The change of religion had been practically forced upon Elizabeth Charlotte before the marriage contract was signed, and Charles Louis knew that such was the case.³ On November 16 the marriage by procuration took place, and the bridal party went forward to meet the Duke of Orleans at Châlons. During her long residence in Paris the Palatine princess was kindly treated by Monsieur, and she was respected at Court; but contrary to the expectations of her father she was never able to accomplish anything for her country.⁴ In later years she was to be the innocent cause of untold sufferings in her native land.

After the seizure of Lorraine, the French preparations for

¹ *Theatrum Europaeum*, xiii, 344.

² The negotiations had been delayed by the question of religion for a considerable time. *Publikationen aus den K. Preuss. Staats-archiven*, xxvi, 450-76.

³ Pfalzgräfin Anna wrote to Charles Louis from Saverne before Metz was reached: "l'état de la dot ne peut pas produire de difficulté celui des biens de Monsieur non plus. La cause de religion est accommodée et c'est un secret qui ne se peut communiquer qu' entre vous et moy." *Publikationen*, xxvi, 463.

⁴ Sophie of Hanover wrote to Charles Louis, Nov. 9, 1677: "Lise-Lotte vit avec beaucoup de liberté et tout cela dans l'innocence; sa gaieté divertit le Roy; je n'ay pas remarqué que son pouvoir va plus loin qu'à le faire rire ny qu'elle fasse des efforts pour le pousser plus avant." *Publikationen*, xxvi, 387. See also p. 394.

war had proceeded simultaneously with the efforts to secure the neutrality of the Rhine princes; by the beginning of 1672, Louis XIV and his advisers considered the situation favorable to strike the long-contemplated blow against Holland. The Elector of Cologne¹ had permitted the establishment during the winter of extensive depots of supplies² within his territories, and he now granted a passage to the French army on its way to Holland. In June Louis moved down the Moselle with an army of over 100,000 men, crossed the Rhine at Tolhuys and pushed on into Holland. So rapid was his march, and so overwhelming were his forces that before the close of the month, he had the States of Holland almost at his mercy and was demanding humiliating terms as the price of peace. This situation was more than Brandenburg and the Emperor could tolerate, although they had remained neutral at the beginning of the attack. On June 25, a defensive alliance was concluded at Berlin between Leopold and Frederick William, which guaranteed the provisions of the treaties of Westphalia,³ the Pyrenees and Aix la Chapelle. A secret article bound both parties to take a hand in the conflict in case Louis XIV should attempt to extend his conquests beyond the limits of Holland. The fear of a French invasion⁴ continued to possess men's minds very fully, and 16,000 Imperialist troops soon joined a strong corps from Brandenburg, and set out for the Southwest.⁵ To anticipate their coming, the French crossed the Rhine

¹ Coxe, *Austria*, ii, 399.

² At Bonn, Nuys and Kayserswerth.

³ "So sollen beyde Bundsgenossen Fleiss anwenden/und sich dahin verbinden dass selbige [Netherlands] unverletzt bleiben mögen." *Diarium Europaeum*, xxvi, Append., p. 25.

⁴ On September 22 the Emperor concluded a treaty of alliance with Denmark, Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick-Lüneburg and Brandenburg. *Di-ar. Europ.*, Append. xxvi, 33.

⁵ *Diarium Europaeum*, Append., p. 309.

under Turenne, invaded the Great Elector's Westphalian possessions, and prevented the army of the allies from proceeding beyond Münster. M. Gravel, French agent in Ratisbon, then hastened before the Diet to protest against the interference of the Elector of Brandenburg in a war which affected none of his interests. M. Gravel explained that the action of the Great Elector in mobilizing troops and marching them toward Holland had necessitated a French invasion of the Empire to protect the German allies of France. He declared that as soon as the allied army would be withdrawn, the French would vacate Imperial territory. Turenne also issued an address¹ to the Rhine princes, promising to leave the territory of the Empire as soon as he could be certain that the German army would advance no further. But "actions speak louder than words," wrote Sincerus Germanus, a German pamphleteer; many German princes felt the truth of his observation, and became more and more alarmed at the nearness of the French troops.² "French ambition is boundless," he continued, "and he who ventures to oppose France will meet the same fate as Lorraine and Holland." He pointed out that France had the material means at hand to establish a great empire; the ruling of certain French Parlements that French territory could not be alienated had, therefore, endangered vast possessions in the Empire which had once belonged to Charlemagne. He called upon all Germans to unite for defense, and to pay no heed to the siren songs³ of the French agents who had said there was

¹ "Sa Majesté a fait faire l'hiver passé et encore nouvellement, des instances fréquents près de Monsieur l'Electeur de Brandebourg afin qu'il ne se meslat point d'une Guerre en laquelle il n'a aucun interest que celui qu'il y veut prendre." Quoted in Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, *Öff. Mein.*, p. 39.

² *Diar. Europ.*, xxvi, 50.

³ "Ce sont des chansons des Syrenes auxquelles il faut boucher les oreilles." P. 56.

no danger. "The losses of one country are of interest to us all; it is always better to put out the fire in our neighbor's house, than to wait until it has attacked our own."

The occasion was also used by Lisola to give out one of his powerful pamphlets, *La Sauce au Verjus*.¹ This was a very pointed reply to a statement which had been made by a French agent, M. Verjus, that France desired nothing but peace, and had no designs upon the Empire; that the real danger to the Empire lay in the increase of the Emperor's power. Lisola charged France, on the contrary, with having been a constant menace to the Empire since the treaties of Westphalia,² having planned nothing less than the acquisition of the imperial crown. He claimed that war was being carried on at that time by the French in the Empire on the pretext of fighting Holland,³ and that French commanders made exactions upon German subjects in the manner of absolute sovereigns. He compared M. Verjus personally to those sneakthieves who drive people into the street by false alarms and then go through the deserted houses at their leisure.⁴

The author of *Soliloquium Germaniæ*, which also appeared at this time, appealed directly to Emperor Leopold to save the Fatherland, for the Diet had proved incompetent to deal with the situation. "O mighty Leopold," he wrote enthusiastically, "drive away the enemies with Thy lion's roar, that Thou mayest be called Father of the Fatherland as Thou hast long merited because of Thy many virtues."⁵ Leopold was ready to take more active measures against France than

¹ Both a French and a German version are to be found in *Diar. Europ.*, xxvi.

² Haller, p. 19.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴ "Ces filoux qui font paroistre de faux spectres dans les maisons pour les piller à leur aise, après en avoir escarte les habitans par une terreur panique." P. 80.

⁵ Haller, 99.

to furnish troops for Brandenburg. On May 13, 1673, his representative at Ratisbon asked the Diet to consider means for regaining lost German territory, and for expelling all foreign troops from Imperial soil.¹

In the meantime French agents had not been idle. On January 14, 1673, a treaty was secured with Bavaria,² which bound the Elector more firmly to the French cause. Ferdinand Maria promised to close his territories to troops of the Emperor in return for French subsidies. At about the same time the Duke of Würtemberg and Neuburg promised neutrality. Louis XIV followed up these successes by the treaty of Vossen with the Great Elector in June, 1673. Frederick William recovered most of the Westphalian territory which had been occupied by the French, and he promised to refrain from interfering in the Dutch war as long as the Empire was not in danger.³ Since M. Gravel had assured the Diet that France desired only the neutrality of the Empire during the war with Holland, the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Neuburg wrote to Leopold,⁴ urging him not to plunge the country into a great war, especially since France had shown a conciliatory spirit.

It might have been possible, therefore, to induce the Emperor to remain neutral, on the basis of the partition treaty of 1668, had Louis XIV shown a sincere desire for peace, but certain events which transpired in the Palatinate at just

¹ *Diarium Europaeum*, xxvii, Append.

² *Recueil des Instructions Diplomatiques*, vii, 41.

³ The Duc de Vitry, envoy to Bavaria, received the following instructions, Oct. 30, 1672: "L'objet de la ligue que Sa Majesté propose n'étant que le repos de l'Empire, l'observation des traités de Westphalie et la sûreté réciproque des princes qui y entreront, en cas que quelqu'un d'eux fût attaqué par les troupes de l'Empereur et de M. l'électeur de Brandebourg." *Ibid.*, vii, 40.

⁴ *Recueil des Instructions Diplomatiques*, vii, 41.

⁵ *Diarium Europaeum*, xxvii, Append.

this time convinced the German princes of the insincerity of his peace pretensions and united the empire behind Leopold in a declaration of war. Appealing to the Elector's ambitious hopes of reward, the French king had sought to win him for an active ally, and had asked Charles Louis to receive a garrison of 3,000 French troops in Oppenheim.¹ But Charles Louis was not willing to take such a radical step, and refused. Angered by this check from such an insignificant prince,² Louis sent Turenne into the Palatinate from Westerwald, and the French commander pushed eastward as far as the Main, levying upon the people all the exactions which were ordinarily taken in time of war, and forcing the Palatinate peasants to work upon the French fortifications.³ This indiscriminate plundering continued when the French retreated to Philipsburg in October, 1673, even though Charles Louis protested vigorously to the French leaders.⁴ Louis sent back a haughty reply, asking what an Elector Palatine would be able to do about it against the King of France.⁵

Despairing of obtaining any satisfaction from the side of France, Charles Louis then sent out an appeal to the Emperor and surrounding states for aid.⁶ As early as August, 1673, Leopold had joined an alliance with Holland and Spain

¹ Häusser, *Rheinpfalz*, ii, 627.

² The Elector showed a complete understanding of the French motives in his protest which followed the invasion: "Es scheint aber jetzo dass dieses Landes-Verwüstung nicht eine Dependenz und Gefolge der Neutralität seye / sondern eher daraus entspringt / dass man über seiner Neutralität verbittert ist." *Theatrum Europaeum*, xi, 344.

³ "Die Landleute gezwungen / ihnen nicht allein Speise und Tranck zu verschaffen / sondern auch die Wege / wodurch sie passiren musten / auszubessern." *Theatrum Europaeum*, xi, 497.

⁴ *Theatrum Europaeum*, xi, 344.

⁵ Charles Louis concluded pathetically: "Wann ich ein Theologus oder Prediger wäre / solte ich von dieser Sache viel sprechen können / welches mich doch wenig helfen würde." *Theat. Europ.*, *ibid.*

⁶ Häusser, ii, 629.

against France, with the purpose of restoring to Holland and Spain the territories recently conquered from those countries by France.¹ Imperial troops had then pushed forward to the Rhine and had occupied Ehrenbreitstein and Coblenz. This had left the approach to Lorraine unprotected and had forced the retreat of Turenne mentioned above. The Elector Palatine then began negotiations at Vienna for a close offensive and defensive alliance with the Emperor. He was ready to relinquish the Rhenish fortress of Germersheim to an Imperial garrison, thus opening another gateway to the advance upon France.

Through his excellent secret service² Louis XIV learned of these plans almost as soon as they had been conceived, and he at once took steps to defeat them, either by regaining the confidence of the Elector, or by anticipating the Emperor in the occupation of Germersheim. Accordingly, the French envoy at Heidelberg, M. Béthune, was ordered to express His Majesty's great regret at the destruction which had been wrought in the Palatinate³ and also at the proposals which had been discussed with the Emperor. He was to assure Charles Louis of his master's sincere and lasting friendship—a friendship which would materialize in 30,000 crowns for the Elector himself and, possibly, also in reparation for the losses which the country had suffered—on condition that Charles Louis should break off negotiations with the Emperor and remain neutral in the approaching war.⁴ At the

¹ *Theatrum Europaeum*, xi, 497. Franconia at once promised 100 horse and 1,000 foot soldiers.

² France had so many agents in Vienna that the imperial general Montecuculi once said that it was all the same whether orders were sent to him or direct to Paris. Häusser, ii, 629.

³ *Theatrum Europaeum*, xi, 498.

⁴ "Si ledit Marquis de Béthune voit que ce prince veuille entrer dans les propositions—et de renoncer aux mesures qu'il auroit commencé de prendre avec l'Empereur, Sa Majesté trouve bon en ce cas que pour

same time the French commander in Alsace, M. Vaubrun, received orders from Louvois to mobilize troops for the purpose of seizing Germersheim at once, should the Elector Palatine persist in treating with the Emperor.

Charles Louis had suffered too many indignities from France by this time to place much reliance upon the offer of friendship. He wrote to Sophie, of Hanover, that Louis XIV might rob him of his country, but the French king could not force him to do that which was against his judgment.¹ Even though threats of severe punishment in case he joined the coalition had been made from Paris, he thought that he would not be the only one to suffer during the war. Therefore, he rejected the French overtures, and the Palatinate Council replied to M. Béthune that the French friendship could not be trusted, for Turenne had only too recently devastated the country as thoroughly as any enemy could have done.²

The French authorities acted promptly when this decision became known. Vaubrun moved out from Alsace with 4,000 troops in February, 1674, and took possession of Germersheim, which was wholly unprepared to resist attack.³ The quickness of the French movement took Charles Louis unawares, for he had not yet been able to complete his arrangements with the Emperor. When he was visited by M. Béthune after the capture of Germersheim he denied having

—lui donner des preuves réelles—de l'affection de Sa Majesté—lui accorder présentement une somme de trente mille Écus." *Recueil des Instruct. Dipl.*, vii, 391.

¹ *Publicationen aus den K. Preuss. Archiven*, xxvi, 177. Also pp. 179, 182.

² "Dass man keine Gleichförmigkeit seiner Protestation aus denen Effecten / so man gesehen / verspüren könnte / indem das Land durch den letzten March der Französis. Armee gantz und gar ruinirt worden." *Theat. Europ.*, xi, 498.

³ *Theat. Europ.*, xi, 498.

made any agreement prejudicial to France. He asked that the French forces be withdrawn from his territory, but this was refused; instead they fortified the post which they had seized and also occupied the smaller places of Seltz and Hagenbach.¹ Then followed a period of systematic devastation of the surrounding country during the months of March and April. The Palatinate forces were too weak to drive the French out, and the Imperial troops were not yet ready to march upon the Rhine. The French commanders realized that the territory east of the Rhine would have to be vacated before a united German advance,² and it was their purpose to reduce it to such a condition that it would not be a base of supplies for hostile armies lying on the French borders.³ They therefore carried out the gruesome policy as fully as possible in the short time before them, to the bitter grief of the Elector, who saw his great work of two decades being undone before his eyes.

It was this distinctly war measure that crystallized German sentiment against France and made the conflict inevitable. This sentiment received public expression on May 28, 1674, when the Diet at Ratisbon unanimously concurred in a declaration of war.⁴ France was declared to be a public enemy

¹ *Theat. Europ.*, xi, 499.

² Ranke, *Französische Geschichte*, iii, 314.

³ That Louis XIV was not utterly heartless and unfeeling in the matter, as is generally believed, the following quotation from a letter to Louvois of Sept. 6, 1673, will show: "sur le rasement de Treves après qu'il sera pris, Je suis tout-à-fait de votre avis—Tout ce qui me fait peine c'est la grandeur de la ville & le nombre des habitants." P. Griffet, *Recueil des Lettres*, ii, 121.

⁴ The author of "Der Abgefertigte Frantzösische Apologist" wrote in 1674: "Die Frantzosen sind weit schädlicher als de Heuschrecken, welche, wo sie eine Nacht hinkommen und verbleiben, auf zehen Jahr Hunger hinterlassen." "Die Elsässer, die armen Tropfen wussten nicht, dass die Frantzosen wie die Pest wären, welche diejenige, so sie am ersten in das Haus nehmen thäten, erwürgete." Quoted by Haller, p. 133.

and the Emperor was instructed to send troops to aid the Elector Palatine. Many of the German princes also concluded separate treaties with the Emperor against France: ¹ thus was inaugurated the great conflict which continued almost unbroken during the remainder of Louis XIV's long reign.

¹ *Theatrum Europaeum*, xi, 513; Haller, p. 91; Coxe, *House of Austria*, ii, 401.

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
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
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